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CAMPAIGN OF 1861, 




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By ROBERT PATTERSON, 

LATE MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS. 




FIFTH THOUSAND. 



PHILADELPHIA: 

JOHN CAMPBELL. 

186 5. 



T O THE 



GALLANT MEN 



WHO SERVEB UNDER MY COMMAND, 

AND WHO WERE THE FIRST TO TAKE UP ARMS 

AT THE CALL OF THEIR COUNTRY, 

I ^ e bit ate 

THE' FOLLOWING NARRATIVE OF THE 

CAMPAIGN OF 1861. 



NARRATIVE. 



It has long been my desire to lay before the public 
the facts and documents which explain the operations of 
the forces under my command in the campaign of 1861. 
The misapprehensions, the misrepresentations which ob- 
tained currency in the absence of correct information 
on the subject, strongly prompted me to supply it, in 
justice to myself and to those who served with me. I 
have, however, been delayed in doing so by public con- 
siderations to which I will presently advert ; but as they 
have, by lapse of time, lost the force that was attributed 
to them, I now feel myself at liberty to make a brief 
but well-attested contribution to the earlier history of 
the war. 

On the 25th of July, 1861, the term of the three 
months' troops from Pennsylvania, whom I commanded, 
having expired, I was relieved from the command of my 
Department in Virginia, and, having been honorably 
discharged from the military service of the United States, 
. returned to civil life. 

The arms of the country had recently met with a 
severe disaster at Bull Run, and the public, whose ex- 



10 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

pectation of success had been of the most sanguine cha- 
racter, were correspondingly depressed. Although con- 
scious that I had executed, as far as lay in my power, 
every order that I had received, and was in no degree 
responsible for a disaster that I could not prevent, I was 
not surprised that I, as well as every other officer hold- 
ing any command of importance at the time, should be 
the object of popular clamor. I was quite satisfied, 
however, to await the returning sense of the people, and 
to abide by their decision, when the natural passion and 
disappointment of the hour should pass away, and a full 
knowledge of the facts should enable them to form an 
intelligent and dispassionate judgment. This would 
very surely and certainly have come about, had it not 
been the interest of a great many persons in authority 
that the truth should not be known, and that no fair 
judgment of the cause of the disaster should be arrived 
at by the public. 

It was of course desirable for those who had directed 
the movements at Bull Run to refer their defeat, if pos- 
sible, to an occurrence for which they were not respon- 
sible, and not allow it to be attributed to any want of 
foresight or military skill on their part. The theory, 
therefore, that it was Johnston's unexpected arrival with 
reinforcements that lost them the battle, for which I was 
entirely responsible, answered the purpose exactly, was 
most ingenious, and highly gratifying to. the wounded 
self-love of the army and the country. 

The only drawback to the theory was that it was 
untrue. The truth is, I could not hold Johnston in the 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 11 

position where they had placed me, and they knew it. 
His arrival was not unexpected, for I had apprised them 
of it ; and his coming did not cause the loss of the battle, 
as I can show by the testimony of the most distinguished 
soldiers who were present at it. 

In determining upon the best mode of repelling these 
charges, bearing a semi-official character, I deemed it 
wise to consult with some of the regular officers of high 
distinction, who had served under me, and in whose 
judgment I had always placed great reliance. Major- 
General George H. Thomas, who had held a command 
under me, and whose subsequent brilliant career has 
justified the high opinion I was then led to entertain 
of him, writes to a mutual friend as follows : 



" Camp near Hyattstown, Md., 
August 25, 186L 

"Dear Colonel : 

" Your note has just been handed me. I had a conver- 
sation with Newton yesterday on the subject of General 
Patterson's campaign. He was on the eve of writing to the 
General, and asked me what he should state was my opinion 
as to the General's course. I told him that he could say 
that, if I were situated as he was, I would make a statement 
of all the facts to the General-in-chief, or the Secretary of 
"War, fortifying it with copies of the orders, &c., and demand 
justice at their hands, and, if they were not disposed to give 
it, I would then demand a court of inquiry. 

" Yours truly, 

" Geo. H. Thomas. 

" P. S. I think, however, that time will set the General 
all right, as I see the papers are much more favorable to him 
than at first." 



12 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

General John Newton and General Fitz-John Porter 
both concurring that the course indicated by General 
Thomas was the true one, and that a newspaper contro- 
versy was both an improper and unsoldierly way of set- 
ting myself right, I addressed the following letter to the 
Secretary of War, after I supposed that a sufficient time 
had elapsed to prevent any information derived from 
an investigation being of detriment to the public service 
[Report Committee 07i Conduct of the War, vol. ii, p. 114) : 

"Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
November 1, 1861. 

" Sir : 

"Believing to the present moment that, on account of 
other persons, a public examination into the manner in which 
the affairs of the Department of Pennsylvania, while under 
my command, were conducted, and the publication of tli^ 
correspondence with, and orders to me of the General-iu- 
chief, especially connected with the late campaign in Mary- 
land and Virginia, might be detrimental to the interests of 
the service, I have refrained from asking for an investiga- 
tion or permission to publish the orders by which I was con- 
trolled. 

" The same reason has caused me studiously to avoid verbal 
statements on the subject, in reply to numerous inquiries. 

" Charges have been made publicly through the press, and 
the impression created, that the design of the campaign was 
not carried out by me, but rather deranged by my neglect 
or violation of orders. 

" Intimations against my loyalty have been insidiously cir- 
culated. 

" From the silence of my immediate commander, I infer 
he does not design to relieve me from the odium attached to 
these reports and rumors. 

" "While I am willing, if the general good demand it, to 
suffer personally, and am desirous that no course on my part 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 13 

shall prove injurious to public interests, yet I believe the 
time has arrived when the question as to the manner in 
which I executed the duties intrusted to me may be fiilly 
investigated with safety, so that the failure 'to accomplish 
certain results, never anticipated of my command by the 
General-in-chief until he saw his defeat, may be ascribed to 
the real cause. 

" Further silence on my part would confirm the impression 
that I plead guilty to the charges against my honor, my 
loyalty, and my military capacity. I have a right at least to 
be relieved from the position in which my long silence, 
caused solely by an earnest desire for the success of our cause, 
has left me. 

" In presenting this my application for a court of inquiry, 
or permission to publish my correspondence with the Geueral- 
in-chief, I claim, and am now ready to substantiate, 

" 1st. That if the General-in-chief ever designed my com- 
mand to enter upon the soil of Virginia with prospect of 
success, he destroyed my power when greatest, and when 
that of the enemy was weakest, by recalling to Washington, 
after they had crossed the Potomac, all my regular troops, 
with the Rhode Island regiment and battery, leaving me but 
a single company of cavalry, which had not then been one 
month in service, and entirely destitute of artillery. 

" 2d. The General-in-chief forbade my advance, and com- 
pelled me to recall to Maryland all the troops which, confi- 
dent of success, had crossed the Potomac into Virginia, in 
execution of a plan which had been submitted to him and 
had received his cordial approbation. 

" 3d. That for a long time the General-in-chief kept my 
command in a crippled condition, and demanded my advance 
after he had withdrawn from me all my available artillery, 
and only after the enemy had had time to become vastly 
my superior in artillery, infantry, and cavalry, and was in- 
trenched. In answer to my earnest appeals, he reinforced 
me only after the occasion for employing reinforcements 
had passed away. 

"4th. That if the General-in-chief designed me to do 



14 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

more than threaten the enemy at Winchester, he did not 
divulge his wish. 

" 5th. That if the Gleneral-in-chief expected me to follow 
to Manassas ' close upon the heels of Johnston,' he expected 
a physical impossibility ; the enemy moving part of the way 
by rail, from an intermediate point, and my army on foot, 
entering an enemy's country, and guarding a heavy train, 
and a depot retained by him in an improper place. 

" 6th. The General-in-chief forbade pursuit of the enemy, 
in the event that he should retire towards Manassas, fearing 
to press him on Washington. 

" 7th. That I was informed by the General-in-chief that 
the attack on Manassas would be made on Tuesday, the 16th 
of July, instead of Sunday, the 2l8t, at which time he directed 
me to make such a demonstration upon Winchester as to 
keep the enemy at that place. I claim that the demonstra- 
tion was made on that day, and that he did not avail himself 
of the fruits of that movement, as he had expected to do. 
All that was demanded of me, and more, was effected. 

"8th. That if the army I commanded had attacked Win- 
chester on Tuesday, the 16th of July, as it has since been 
claimed I was ordered to do, two armies instead of one would 
have been demoralized, and the enemy would have turned 
with all the flush of victory to a triumph in front of Wash- 
ington. 

" 9th. That I have suffered additional injustice at the hands 
of the General-in-chief, who sanctioned and fixed the impres- 
sion that the enemy at Winchester was inferior to me in 
force in every arm of the service, and yet has not corrected 
the report, although he knew, two days after the Battle of 
Bull Run, that siege artillery, three times as numerous, and 
heavier than mine, had been left by the enemy at Winches- 
ter, while a greater number of guns had been carried away. 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" R. Patterson, 

" Major-General." 



• IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 15 

This application was acknowledged as follows : 

" War Department, 
Washington, November 3, 1861. 

"Dear Sir: 

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter, bearing date iN'ovember 1. The Secretary of War is 
absent on a visit North, I will forward it to him by this 
day's mail, and ask for instructions. 

" Very respectfully, 

" Thomas A. Scott, 

" General R. Patterson, " Ass't Secretary of War. 

"Philadelphia." 

After waiting a reasonable time for an answer to my 
application, I again appealed to the Secretary of War, 
as follows : 

" Philadelphia, November 26, 1861. 
"Sir: 

" I respectfully request that you will do me the justice to 
refer to my letter of the 1st instant, and give it your early 
attention. I cannot refrain from intimating a confident 
hope that my application for a court of inquiry will meet 
with your favorable consideration, and that an order for the 
detail will be made at the earliest moment consistent with 
the interests of the service. 

" I have the honor to be, with great respect, 
" Your obedient servant, 

" R. Patterson, 

" Hon. Simon Cameron, " Major-General. 

" Secretary of War." 

This brought me the following refusal of my applica- 
tion : 

"War Department, November 30, 1861. 

" General : 

" I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 
26th instant, calling my attention to your communication ot 



16 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

the Ist I^ovember, wlaicli contains a request for an inquiry 
into the late campaign in Virginia, in which you commanded 
a part of the United States forces. 

" Your letter did not reach me until my return to this 
city, and subsequent to the departure of Lieutenant-General 
Scott for Europe. 

" There appears to have been no precedent in our service 
for an investigation or trial of an officer's conduct after he 
has received an honorable discharge. The inquiry you desire 
to have instituted would equally concern the late General- 
in-chief, and, as it appears to me, in justice to him, should 
not be made in his absence. 

" The respect I have always entertained for you, as well 
a& the friendly relations which have long existed between 
us, would claim for any personal request from you the most 
prompt and favorable attention ; but, in my public capacity, 
in the present condition of aft'airs, I cannot convince myself 
that my duty to the Government and to the country would 
justify me in acceding to your request. I must, therefore, 
reluctantly decline the appointment of a court of inquiry at 
this time. 

" With much respect, your obedient servant, 

" Simon Cameron, 

" General R. Patterson, " Secretary of War. 

" Philadelphia, Penna." 

The voyage of the General-in-chief to Europe was, of 
course, as unexpected to me as it was to the public at 
large, although the additional insinuation was made 
against me that I had taken advantage of his absence to 
make my request for a trial. The receipt of my letter 
asking an investigation was, however, fortunately ac- 
knowledged before he left the country, and his speedy 
return removed at least one reason for refusing to allow 
me to be heard. Determined to persevere and obtain 
an investigation, if possible, I went to Washington and 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 17 

called at the War Department, had a long interview 
with the Secretary, General Cameron, and the Assistant 
Secretary, Hon. T. A. Scott, showed the orders and 
correspondence, and insisted on an investigation. Both 
admitted that the official orders and correspondence 
as presented placed the case in a very different light 
from their previous understanding of it. Mr. Scott 
said I ought to have a court, in order that justice might 
be done to me and all others interested in the matter. 
To this the Secretary assented, but said that a court 
would throw the blame on General Scott, and this he 
would never consent to ; that General Scott had now 
retired from the service full of years and full of honors ; 
that he desired him to pass the remainder of his life in 
repose, enjoying, as he deserved, the gratitude of the 
whole country; and that no consideration on earth 
would induce him to do any act that would plant a 
thorn in General Scott's pillow. To all this I cordially 
assented, adding that there was no man living I more 
honored and venerated than General Scott, and that, it 
it were simply a question between General Scott and 
myself as to who should bear the blame, if the blame 
rested with either, I would be willing to bear it, and 
go down to the grave with it; but that I had chil- 
dren and grandchildren and warm friends, and it was 
due to them, and to Pennsylvania, whose officer I was, 
as well as to the troops I commanded, that the truth 
should be made manifest ; that I must have a trial, or 
an official order or letter referring to my services and 
approving them. To this General Cameron assented, 

2 



18 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

and promised to give one, but, unfortunately for me, be- 
fore it was given, circumstances occurred which induced 
him to leave the Cabinet, after which he could not issue 
an order. At the close of the interview, General Came- 
ron said he would like the President to see the official 
orders and correspondence, to which I replied that I 
desired this exceedingly. Mr. Scott offered to see the 
President at once. He did so. The President fixed 
7 J o'clock in the evening, at the Executive Mansion. 
I called at that* hour, was most kindly received, and 
read the orders and correspondence, to which the Presi- 
dent attentively listened. When I had finished, and 
after some conversation, the President addressed me in 
nearly the following words : " General Patterson, I have 
never found fault with or censured you ; I have never 
been able to see that you could have done anything else 
than you did do. Your hands were tied; you obeyed 
orders, and did your duty, and I am satisfied with your 
conduct." This was said with a manner so frank, so can- 
did, and so manly, as to secure my respect, confidence, 
and good will. I expressed to the President my great 
gratification with, and tendered my sincere thanks for, 
his fairness towards me, and his courtesy in hearing my 
case, and giving me some five hours of his time. I said 
that so far as he and the War Department were con- 
cerned I was satisfied, but that I must have a court and 
a trial by my peers, in order to have a public approval 
of my conduct, and stop the abuse daily lavished upon 
me. The President replied that he would cheerfully 
accede to any practicable measure to do me justice, but 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 19 

that I need not expect to escape abuse as long as I was 
of any importance or value to the community, adding 
that he received infinitely more abuse than I did, but 
he had ceased to regard it, and I must learn to do the 
same. 

My next application for redress was to Congress. At 
my request. Mr. Sherman offered the following resolu- 
tion in the Senate of the United States [Report, p. 117, 
No. 3) : 

•' Senate of the United States, . 
December 17, 1861. 
" On motion of Mr. Sherman, 

" Besolved, That the Secretary of War he requested, if not 
incompatible with the public interests, to furnish the Senate 
with copies of the correspondence between Lieutenant- 
General Scott and Major-General Patterson, with all orders 
from the former to the latter, from the 16th day of April, 
1861, to the 25th day of July, inclusive.'' 

To this resolution of the Senate, unanimously adopted, 
the following response was made : 



'♦War Department, December 24, 1861. 

" Sir : 

" In answer to a resolution of the Senate of the 17th in- 
stant, I have the honor to transmit herewith a report of the 
Adjutant-General, from which it will be perceived that it is 
not deemed compatible with the public interest at this time 
to furnish the correspondence between Generals Scott and 
Patterson, as called for. 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" Simon Cameron, 

" Hon. H. Hamlin, " Secretary of War. 

•-' President of the Senate." 



20 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

*• Headquarters of the Armt, 
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, 
December 23, 1861. 

" Sir : 

" In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor 
to report that, after due consideration, the General-in-chief 
is of the opinion it would be ' incompatible with the public 
interest to furnish the Senate with copies of the corresj^on- 
dence between Lieutenant-General Scott and Major-General 
Patterson, and with all orders from the former to the latter 
from the 16th day of April, 1861, to the 25th day of July, in- 
clusive,' as called for in the Senate resolution of December 
17th, 1861. 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" L. Thomas, 

"Hon. Secretary of War." "Adjutant-General. 

Had a court of inquiry been allowed me, no publica- 
tion of the orders or correspondence would have been 
necessary. The court would have investigated the case, 
and if it had appeared that I had obeyed my orders and 
done my duty, they would have said so. I would have 
been satisfied, and there the case would have terminated. 

The refusal to publish my correspondence and orders, 
being put upon the ground " that it was not deemed 
compatible with the public interest," not only deprived 
me of their official publication, but debarred me from 
publishing them in any other way, although I was daily 
the subject of attack, upon points which they would in- 
stantly have refuted. I was thus placed in a position 
in which I could be attacked with perfect impunity, 
while any answer by myself would have rendered me 
liable to the reproach of publishing what the highest 
military authorities deemed detrimental to the public 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 21 

service. I therefore bore, and have borne without a word 
of reply, the absurd calumnies that have been heaped 
upon me. Nothing was too gross for popular belief. It 
was even asserted as a fact beyond all doubt, that Gene- 
ral Joseph E. Johnston who commanded the forces op- 
posing me, and with whom I had no connection or rela- 
tionship, was my brother-in-law, and it is probably now 
credited everywhere out of Philadelphia. 

The facts which I have stated, certainly prove that 
I had no desire to avoid an investigation of my official 
conduct, but that I was then, as I am now, not only will- 
ing but anxious to meet frankly and fairly any allega- 
tion that could be made against me. That I had been 
honorably discharged from the service of my country, 
was not, as it might have been, put forward by me as a 
reason why I should not ask for an investigation, but 
was the excuse given by the Government for not grant- 
ing it. Having by an honorable discharge declared they 
had no fault to find with me, they said that no court 
they could grant me could do any more. 

I certainly think, therefore, I can claim that I was 
justified by those who had full knowledge of what I had 
done, and full authority to rebuke me had I done wrong. 

The day after the War Department had declined to 
furnish the Senate with copies of the correspondence 
and orders received by me from the Commander-in-chief, 
as being detrimental to the public interests, a Committee 
of Congress on the " Conduct of the War" began an in- 
vestigation of the circumstances attending the Battle of 
Bull Run, including my operations. This struck me as 



22 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

somewhat inconsistent, but the suggestion did not then 
occur to me that the object was, by a Star Chamber pro- 
ceeding, to prepare a report setting all fair play and truth 
at defiance. This too plainly appeared subsequently. 
At the time I was much gratified, supposing, of course, 
that the investigation would be full, fair, and candid. I 
need hardly say, in addressing American citizens, that 
in a question involving all that is dear to a man or an 
officer, I expected to be confronted with any witness who 
should testify against me. I presumed that I should 
be allowed to cross-examine them. I supposed that at 
least my own witnesses would be examined. Not so, 
however, did it appear to this Honorable Committee. I 
never was allowed to hear the evidence of a single wit- 
ness. I never was permitted to have a copy of any testi- 
mony affecting my character or conduct. I was refused 
the privilege of having examined the witnesses I deemed 
most material. Even the following questions, left with 
the Committee, certainly unobjectionable, which I re- 
quested, if not myself permitted to be present, might be 
asked by the Committee, appear by the published testi- 
mony never to have been put to a single witness : 

1. Were you with General Patterson's column in July 
last ? If so, in what capacity ? 

2. Did or did not General Patterson possess the re- 
spect and confidence of his officers and men ? 

3. What was the effect on General Patterson's army 
of the order of the Commander-in-chief directing him to 
send to Washington all his regular troops, with the Rhode 
Island regiment and battery, and the consequent recross- 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 23 

ing of the Potomac by that part of the army which had 
entered Virginia? 

4. Was General Patterson's movement from Martins- 
burg by Bunker Hill and Charlestown, on the 15th, 16th, 
and 17th of July, in your judgment, judicious or other- 
wise, and were this and his other movements well con- 
ducted or otherwise ? 

5. Which do you consider the better strategic point, 
Martinsburg or Charlestown ? 

6. What at that time, according to your knowledge 
and information, was the relative strength in men and 
guns, of the armies of General Patterson and General 
Johnston ? 

7. Did you then or do you now think that General 
Patterson ought to have attacked General Johnston at 
Winchester, and if he had done so, what in your opinion 
would have been the probable result? 

8. Was there any open opposition to a further ad- 
vance by officers or men, and if so, where or when ? 

9. Did or did not General Patterson use his influ- 
ence with the volunteers of his command, whose term 
of service was about to expire, to remain with him a 
week or ten days longer, to enable him to hold his posi- 
tion at Charlestown till reinforced with three-years 
men, or to obey any order he might receive from Gene- 
ral Scott, and if so, what was the character of his appeal, 
and what was the response to it ? 

On the first day of my own examination, I said to the 
Committee, "If any testimony has been given that affects 
the management of my column, I would like to have it 



24 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

read before I begin. I believe it is customary to have 
that done." The Chairman in response to this said, 
" What Congress expects of us, is to obtain such facts as 
we suppose will be useful in throwing light upon the 
military operations of the army, in order to apply any 
remedy that may be necessary. I perceive by the docu- 
ments that you have before you, that you are about 
entering upon what is a very minute narration : that 
might be necessary if you were accused ; it might then 
be very proper." The Hon. Andrew Johnson here in- 
terfered, and on his motion I was allowed to proceed 
and make my statement, certainly under the impression 
that before the Committee, at least, to use the words of 
the Chairman, " I was not accused," and had therefore 
nothing to reply to. 

It now appears from their Report, that the main 
portion of the testimony upon which they have relied 
to make out an accusation against me, was then in their 
possession, yet it was thus withheld from me, and it was 
only by the courtesy of Mr. Johnson that I was per- 
mitted to make a statement. 

That it was not the intention of Congress that any 
committee of their body should so prostitute their func- 
tions, I sincerely believe. No stronger evidence can be 
given of their sense of the gross unfairness of the course 
pursued by this Committee than the resolution adopted 
in the House of Representatives in 1862, on the motion 
of Mr. Colfax. 

Mr. Colfax's resolution was adopted, — yeas 90, nays 
41. It is as follows : 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 25 

" Resolved, That tlie course adopted by the Naval Investi- 
gating Committee of 1859, of communicating to the officers 
of the Government copies of the evidence apparently adverse 
to them, and giving them an opportunity to cross-examine 
the witnesses against them, or to refute or explain their tes- 
timony, is, in the opinion of this House, worthy of imitation, 
whenever practicable, by the investigating committees ap- 
pointed by order of the House of Representatives, especially 
when the said committees receive and collect such testimony 
in secret session ; and that it is contrary to the plainest princi- 
ples of justice to condemn any citizen upon ex parte evidence, 
taken against him by a committee in secret, and the purport 
of which has not, if practicable, been laid before him by the 
said committee, with an opportunity to explain or refute it 
before the report is made public." 



Any body or committee seeking truth could hardly 
have acted otherwise. It is only those bent on making 
a report consonant with their own wishes, who could 
lose sight of all fairness and justice in effecting their 
purpose. 

Since the Committee, in its published Report on the 
Battle of Bull Run, has endeavored to countenance the 
imputation of blame to me for " failure to hold the forces 
of Johnston in the Valley of the Shenandoah," I pre- 
sume that I am at liberty, as I can no longer hope for 
a military investigation, to state my own case without 
detriment to the public interest. This I propose now 
to do. 

On the 15th of April, 1861, the President, by procla- 
mation, called for a military force of seventy-five thou- 
sand men, of which the quota assigned to Pennsylvania 
was at first sixteen (afterwards reduced to fourteen) regi- 



26 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

ments, to serve as infantry or riflemen, for the term of 
three months, unless sooner discharged. On the 16th, 
myself and the late Major-General W. H. Keim were 
selected by Governor Curtin as the Major-Generals to 
command the Pennsylvania troops. 

On the same day, instantly relinquishing the large 
business in which I was engaged, I commenced organ- 
izing regiments for service in Philadelphia, with great 
and immediate success. 

To use the words of the then Adjutani>General of bur 
State : 

" Pennsylvania not only furnished promptly her assigned 
quota of fourteen regiments, but increased the number to 
twenty-five, and such was the patriotic ardor of the people 
that the service of about thirty additional regiments had to 
be refused, making in all more than one-half the requisition 
of the President. Four days after this call, Pennsylvania 
had placed at the national capital six hundred men, the first 
to arrive for its defence, and ten days later the entire twenty- 
five regiments were organized and in the field." 

While performing my part in this preparation, in 
which all were zealous and active, I was by the order of 
Lieutenant-General Scott, placed in command of " the 
Department of Washington," embracing the States of 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, and the District 
of Columbia, my headquarters being in Philadelphia. 
I was unceasingly occupied in organizing, equipping and 
forwarding troops for the defence of the city of Wash- 
ington, in sustaining the Union feeling in Maryland and 
Delaware, and in the adoption of means to prevent one 
or both from seceding and joining the States in rebellion, 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 27 

also, in providing means for the defence and protection 
of the frontier of my Department, and of the Delaware 
River. My attention was also early engaged in opening 
a route to Washington via Annapolis, for which pur- 
jDOse I sent the Hon. John Sherman of Ohio, one of my 
aides-de-camp, to General Scott, with a despatch point- 
ing out the advantage of the Annapolis route at that 
time. 

My suggestion was adopted, and the Annapolis route 
approved. Pending this, I had ordered Brigadier-Gene- 
ral B. F. Butler with a Massachusetts regiment to pro- 
ceed to Annapolis, in a steamboat patriotically furnished 
for the purpose by S. M. Felton, Esq., President of the 
Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Com- 
pany. General Butler was ordered to hold Annapolis, 
to employ the regiments as they arrived there in opening 
the way to Washington, to seize the Annapolis Junction, 
to station a competent force there, and guard the whole 
line of road thoroughly. These services he rendered in 
conformity with my orders. 

Having succeeded in securing a well-protected line 
of communication with Washington, I turned my atten- 
tion to re-establishing the route through Baltimore, 
and compelling the turbulent spirits of that city to sub- 
mit to lawful authority, and in this I was well aided by 
his Excellency Governor Hicks. The troops to force a 
passage through Baltimore, were the First Regiment 
Pennsylvania Volunteer Artillery (Seventeenth of the 
line), and Sherman's Battery, the whole under com- 
mand of my son, the late General Francis E. Patterson. 



28 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

It is due to the officers and men of this command to say, 
that their entrance into and passage through Baltimore, 
was an encouraging exhibition of Union determination. 

I had been deeply convinced that the contest upon 
which we were entering was very much underrated by 
our rulers, and that the three months' troops, though 
very well for the moment, should not be our sole depen- 
dence for carrying on operations of the magnitude which 
I thought that I foresaw. 

I felt that if advantage was not taken of the time 
which their service gave us to prepare for the future, we 
should find ourselves at some critical moment with all 
our troops going out of service and none coming in to 
replace them. 

The interruption of all communication with Wash- 
ington left me, in the absence of orders, to rely wholly 
upon my own judgment as commander of the Depart- 
ment, and I then took a step by which I incurred very 
great responsibility; and, although I received the im- 
plied censure of the War Department by their revocation 
of my order, as soon as they were able to communicate 
with the North, yet I have never regretted it, and I con- 
fidently appeal to subsequent events to justify my action. 

On the 25th of April I addressed the following letter 
to the Governor of Pennsylvania : 

" Headquarters 
Military Department of Washington, 
Philadelphia, April 25th, 1861. 
" Sir : 

" I feel it my duty to express to you my clear and decided 
opiuion that the force at the disposal of this Department 
should be increased without delay. 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 29 

" 1, therefore, have to request your Excellency to direct 
that twenty-five additional regiments of infantry and one 
regiment of cavalry be called for forthwith, to be mustered 
into the service of the United States. 

" Ofiicers will be detailed to inspect and muster the men 
into service as soon as I am informed of the points of rendez- 
vous which may be designated by your Excellency. 
" I have the honor to be, with great respect, 
" Your obedient servant, 

" R. Patterson, 

" His Excellency Andrew G. Curtin, "Major-General. 

" Governor of Pennsylvania." 

The Governor, with his usual promptness, responded 
to this appeal, and had actually raised a large body of 
men, when the War Department declined to indorse my 
call. On the contrary, they would not enlarge their first 
requisition to cover the regiments already in the field 
from Pennsylvania, but stated " that it was more im- 
portant to reduce than enlarge the number." 

In spite of this rebuff, I determined to make one more 
effort to obtain at least some troops " for the war" while 
they had the disposition to enlist for that term. With 
this view, I sent to the Secretary of War my aide-de- 
camp, the Hon. John Sherman, Senator from Ohio, who 
had done me the honor of serving on my staff, hoping 
that his well-known character for. patriotism and abi- 
lity might add weight to my views, and induce the Sec- 
retary to modify his determination, and permit me to 
secure at least three of my fmest regiments, who were 
willing to remain and re-enlist. But in vain, as the fol- 
lowing letter will show: 

"Washington, May 30, 1861. 

" My dear General : 

"I have had, as you suggested, an interview with the 



"30 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

Secretary of War. He says he cannot now accept any more 
regiments for the war ; that no doubt the three years' men 
will be needed, but that the question of their acceptance for 
the war cannot be decided until near the expiration of their 
present enlistment. I feel very well assured that if the as- 
pect of affairs is not materially changed that these regiments 
will be accepted, if within the next month they justify your 
confidence in them. 

" The Secretary informs me that the two New York regi- 
ments now at Harrisburg will be left under your command. 

" I write in great haste to send by present opportunity. 
" With great respect, 

" John Sherman. 

"Major-General R. Patterson." 

The Executive of Pennsylvania fortunately took a 
broader view of the subject, and induced the Legislature 
to pass an act to take into the service of the State the 
men whom, at my request, he had commenced raising 
for the United States. In his messege of 1862 he says : 

" Men more than suflUcient in number to form some ten 
regiments of the Reserve Corps had, previous to the 15th of 
May, been accepted by me in pursuance of a call on rae 
(afterwards rescinded) for twenty-five regiments, and were 
then already assembled and subject to my control. Most of 
these men volunteered for the Reserve Corps, and were im- 
mediately organized." 

This was the origin of the famous Reserve Corps of 
Pennsylvania, which was so gladly taken into the service 
of the United States immediately after the Battle of 
Bull Run, and by its prompt transfer from Harrisburg 
to Washington, gave security to the national capital. 

Of their glorious after career, it is not necessary for 
me to speak ; it forms one of the brightest pages in the 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 31 

history of the war. Had they been accepted by the 
Government when I asked for them, they could have 
been ready for the movement of General McDowell, and 
twenty-five thousand three years' troops would thus 
have been added to his force. If added to my column, 
I could have left the Pennsylvania border amply pro- 
tected on my advance, and could have joined battle 
without violating my instructions, to be " in superior 
or equal force," and with every prospect of a brilliant 
result. 

Having established order in Baltimore and secured 
free communication with Washington, my attention was 
next turned to the recapture of Harper's Ferry, then held 
by the rebels under General Joseph E. Johnston. 

To accomplish this a camp was formed at Chambers- 
burg, under the late Major-General W. H. Keim. On 
the 2d of June I left Philadelphia and took command 
in person of the troops at Chambersburg, intending to 
carry out a plan previously submitted to and approved 
by General Scott, to attack and capture or disperse the 
enemy at Harper's Ferry. On the 4th of June I was 
forbidden to advance until certain reinforcements were 
sent me. The order was as follows : 



"Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, June 4, 1861. 

" Major-General Patterson, U. S. A., 

Chambersburg, Pa. 

" General Scott says, do not make a move forward until 
you are joined by a battery of the Fourth (4th) Artillery and 
a battalion of five (5) companies Third U. S. Infantry, to 



32 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

leave here the 6th iust. for Carlisle. Company F, Fourth 
Artillery, is the one to be mounted. 

" Orders have been given to purchase horses and collect 
the guns, equipments, &c., as soon as possible, at Carlisle. 
It will require some days, but the General considers this 
addition to your force indispensable. If two (2) Ohio regi- 
ments come to you, retain them. 

"Also halt the first two (2) regiments that may pass 
through Harrisburg from the North to this city and add them 
to your force. You will receive a letter from the General 
before you move. 

" E. D. TOWNSEND, 

"Asst. Adjt. Genl." 

The following is the letter of instruction referred to 
(see Report, vol. ii, p. 118) : 

"Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, June 8, 1861. 

" Sir : 

" I think your expedition against Harper's Ferry well 
projected, and that success in it would be an important step 
in the war. But there must be no reverse. Hence I have 
given you the best reinforcements within my reach, and 
have just ordered Colonel Burnside's fine Rhode Island regi- 
ment of infantry with its battery (about twelve hundred 
strong) to proceed to Carlisle and there receive your orders. 
A company of the Fourth Artillery (to receive its horses and 
battery at Carlisle), with the battalion of the Third Infantry, 
took the same route, and with the same instructions, yester- 
day. This battery may not be ready for you in time. These 
heavy rains must swell the Potomac and delay your passage 
some days. I am organizing to aid you a small secondary 
expedition under Colonel Stone. He will have about twenty- 
five hundred men, including two troops of cavalry and a 
section (two pieces) of artillery. 

" The movements by road and canal will commence the 
10th inst., and, passing up the country (touching at Rock- 
ville), be directed upon the ferry opposite Leesburg. This 
may be but a diversion in your favor, but possibly it may be 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 33 

turned into an eiFective co-operation. Colonel Stone will be 
instructed to open a communication with you, if practicable, 
and you will make a corresponding effort on your part. I 
do not distinctly foresee that we shall be able to make any 
diversion in your behalf on the other side of the Potomac, 
beyond repairing the lower part of the railroad leading from 
Alexandria towards the Manassas Gap. 

" I have said that we must sustain no reverse; but this is 
not enough : a check or a drawn battle would be a victory 
to the enemy, filling his heart with joy, his ranks with men, 
and his magazines with voluntary contributions. 

" Take your measures, therefore, circumspectly ; make a 
good use of your engineers and other experienced staff offi- 
cers and generals, and attempt nothing without a clear pros- 
pect of success, as you will find the enemy strongly posted 
and not inferior to you in numbers. 

" With entire confidence in your valor and judgment, 
" I remain your brother soldier, 

" WiNFiELD Scott. 

'' Major-General Patterson, 

" United States Forces." 

When General Johnston perceived that I was about 
to cross the Potomac, he abandoned Harper's Ferry and 
retreated towards Bunker Hill, 

On the next day my forces commenced crossing the 
Potomac in pursuit. Part of my forces were on one 
side of the river and part on the other, all in the highest 
state of confidence and excitement, when I received a 
telegraphic despatch to send " all the regular troops, 
horse and foot, and the Rhode Island regiment, to Wash- 
ington." 

" Washington, June 16, 1861. 
" What movement, if any, in pursuit of the enemy, 
do you propose to make consequent on the evacuation of 

3 



34 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

Harper's Ferry ? If no pursuit, and I recommend none, 
specifically, send to me, at once, all the regular troops, horse 
and foot, with you, and the Rhode Island regiment. 

" WiNPiELD Scott. 

" Major-General Patterson." 

In my response to this despatch, I said {Report, vol. ii, 
p. 122), " To-day and to-morrow about 9000 will cross to 
Virginia, there to await transportation, and to be sent 
forward in detachments well sustained ;" and I requested 
that " the regulars be permitted to remain for the pre- 
sent," and I submitted my desire, "first, to transfer to 
Harper's Ferry my base of operations, depots, headquar- 
ters, &c. ; second, to open and maintain free communica- 
tion east and west along the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road ; third, to hold at Harper's Ferry, Martinsburg, and 
Charlesto^^Ti, a strong force, gradually and securely ad- 
vancing, as they are prepared, portions towards Win- 
chester, &c., and operate with the column in the third 
proposition towards Woodstock, and cut off all commu- 
nication with the west. We will thus force the enemy 
to retire, and recover without a struggle a conquered 
country," &c. I also added, " If I am permitted to carry 
out this plan, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and Canal 
will be in operation in a week, and a free line to St. 
Louis established." In answer to this the General-in- 
chief telegraphed to me : 

" "Washington, June 16, 1861. 
" Why a detachment upon Winchester ? If strong enough, 
the detachment would drive the enemy from Winchester, 
Strasburg, and Manassas Junction, or perhaps from Winches- 
ter via Staunton, towards Richmond. What would be the 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 35 

gain by driving the enemy on either of these places ? And if 
your detachment be not strong, it would be lost. Hence the 
detachment, if not bad, would be useless. The enemy is 
concentrating upon Arlington and Alexandria, and this is the 
line to be looked to. Is Wallace, at Cumberland, threatened 
from below ? K so, the threatening detachment is cut off by 
your passage of the Potomac. McClellan has been told to- 
day, to send nothing across the mountains to support you, 
since the evacuation of Harper's Ferry. You are strong 
enough without. The regulars with you are most needed 
here ; send them and the Rhode Island regiment as fast as 
disengaged. Keep within the above limits until you can 
satisfy me you ought to go beyond them. Report frequently. 

" WiNFiELD Scott. 

" Major-General Patterson, Commanding." 

" Washington, June 16, 1861. 
" You tell me you arrived last night at Hagerstown, and 
McClellan writes you are checked at Harper's Ferry. Where 
are you ? 

" WiNFiELD Scott. 

"Major-General Patterson, Commanding." 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, July 17, 1861. 

" To General Patterson : 

"We are pressed here. Send the troops I have twice 
called for, without delay. 

"WiNFiELD Scott." 

This last was imperative, and the troops were sent, 
leaving me without a single piece of artillery, and for 
the time with but one troop of cavalry, which had not 
been in service over a month. Of this recall General 
Cadwalader, in his testimony before the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, thus speaks : 

" Answer. My division, as a part of General Patterson's 



36 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

column, was in the advance. I crossed the Potomac from 
Williamsport, and when Johnston retreated, as we advanced 
upon Harper's Ferry, we went down as far as Falling Waters, 
on the Virginia side. 

*' I was there met with an order to send to Washington 
all the regular troops — they were all under my command — 
as it was thought that Johnston had fallen back to reinforce 
Beauregard, and that Washington was in danger. All the 
regular troops being ordered to Washington, and the object 
of dislodging the enemy from Harper's Ferry having been 
accomplished. General Patterson was compelled, or rather 
induced, to give me the order to fall back. I was then on 
the way to Martinsburg, and had got as far as Falling Waters, 
some miles on the other side of the Potomac. General Pat- 
terson was still at Hagerstown. A great misfortune, by-the- 
by, was that recall." 

The Hon. John Sherman, in a letter addressed to me, 
dated August 30, 1861, gives it as his judgment that 
" the great error of General Scott undoubtedly was, that 
he gave way to a causeless apprehension that Washing- 
ton was to be attacked before the meeting of Congress, 
and therefore weakened you when you were advancing. 
No subsequent movement could repair that error." This 
I venture to say, will be the conclusion of any one who 
dispassionately examines the subject. I was mortified 
and humiliated at having to recross the river without 
striking a blow. I knew that my reputation would be 
grievously damaged by it; the country could not under- 
stand the meaning of this crossing and recrossing, this 
marching and countermarching in face of the foe, and 
that I would be censured without stint for such appa- 
rent vacillation and want of purpose. In this I was not 
mistaken, for not only the public, but persons in "the 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 37 

highest military positions" at Washington, did great in- 
justice to me and my command. I was criticized, too, 
for not doing, exactly what my own plan contemplated, 
and what I was actually carrying out, when forced to 
return to this side of the Potomac by the action of the 
General-in-chief. Of this I was informed in the sub- 
joined letter from the Hon. John Sherman. 

"Washington, June 30, 1861. 

" My dear Sir : 

. . . . " Great injustice is done you and your command 
here, and by persons in the highest military positions. I 
have been asked over and over again why you did not push 
on to Martinsburg, Harper's Ferry, and Winchester. I have 
been restrained by my being on your staff from saying more 
than simply, that you executed your orders, and that when 
you were prepared to advance your best troops were recalled 

to Washington 

" Very truly, yours, 

" John Sherman. 

" Major-General K. Patterson." 

On the 20th of June, the General-in-chief asked me 
*' without delay to propose to him a plan of operations." 
On the 21st I submitted one. as follows {Report, vol. ii, 
p. 123) : 

" Headquarters Department of Pennsyltania, 
Hagerstown, Maryland, June 21, 1861. 

" Colonel : 

" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the tele- 
gram of the General-in-chief, calling for a plan of operations, 
with a portion of my force, to sweep the enemy from Lees- 
burg, &c. 

" Inclosed is a copy of my telegraphic reply. The fol- 
lowing is my plan. To carry out the views of the General- 
in-chief, I propose, — 

" 1st. To occupy the Maryland Heights, with a brigade 



38 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

(2100 men); fortify and arm with Doubleday's artillery; 
provision for 20 days, to secure against investment. 

" 2d. To move all supplies to Frederick, and immediately 
thereafter abandon this line of operations, threatening with 
a force to open a route through Harper's Ferry, this force 
to be the sustaining one for the command on Maryland 
Heights. 

" 3d. To send everything else available, horse, foot, and 
artillery, to cross the Potomac near Point of Rocks, and 
unite with Colonel Stone at Leesburg. From that point I 
can operate as circumstances shall demand and your orders 
require. 

" If no blow is to be struck here, I think this change of 
position important to keep alive the ardor of our men, as 
well as to force an enemy. The reasons for this change of 
depot will be so apparent to the General-in-chief that I need 
not refer to them. By the employment of the local trans- 
portation of the country, I can soon make the necessary 
changes, and will hasten to carry out your orders. 

" I have many reports in regard to the movements of the 
force opposite us in Virginia, and have reason to believe that 
when the regulars were withdrawn. General Johnston, with 
13,000 men and 22 pieces of artillery, was marching to the 
attack, that night posted his forces, expecting an attack the 
following morning. I regret we did not meet the enemy, so 
confident am I that with this well-appointed force, the result 
would have been favorable to us, and that this portion of 
Virginia would now be peaceably occupied. Reports of the 
enemy having returned to Harper's Ferry, and driven the 
occupants to this shore, reached me yesterday. I imme- 
diately despatched a strong force to take the position in the 
vicinity of Sharpsburg, and protect all parties on this side of 
the river, and drive back any force which may attempt to 
cross. 

" I am. Colonel, very respectfully, 

" Your obedient servant, 

" R. Patterson, 

"Major-General, Commanding. 
"Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C." 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 39 

Had this plan been adopted, the army of General 
McDowell and my own would have been precisely where 
they ought to have been. I would have been in a posi- 
tion to have aided General McDowell, and to have taken 
and torn up, if I could not have held, a portion of "the 
railroad leading from Manassas to the Valley of Vir- 
ginia." This would not only have destroyed " the com- 
munications between the forces under Beauregard and 
those under Johnston," but it would have prevented 
either from throwing large reinforcements to the other 
when assailed. 

And if I could not prevent Johnston from joining 
Beauregard, which I certainly could not do while sta- 
tioned anywhere between Williamsport and Winchester, 
I could have joined McDowell in the attack on Manas- 
sas, and assailed and turned the enemy's left. Had my 
suggestions been adopted, the Battle of Bull Run might 
have been a victory, instead of a defeat. 

It thus appears that, just one month before the Battle 
of Bull Run, knowing that I was upon a false line and 
could do no good there, I proposed to abandon it and 
go to Leesburg, where it is now admitted I ought to 
have been. The wisdom of this plan is singularly con- 
firmed by the opinion of one of the ablest military 
writers and critics of the day, Major-General Halleck. 
In an article on " The Art of War," published in the 
New York Times, of the 22d of July, 1862, and written 
in entire ignorance of my having previously suggested 
the very course he recommends, he says : 



40 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

' " Patterson and McDowell's columns moved on exterior 
lines, leaving the armies of Johnston and Beauregard be- 
tween them ; they concentrated their forces at Bull Run and 
defeated McDowell's army, and might have done the same 
thing to the army of Patterson. Had the latter crossed the 
Potomac at Leesburg, he would have threatened Johnston's com- 
munications much more effectually than at Martinsburg, and at 
the same time would have been near enough to McDowell to assist 
him, or to receive assistance from him, as circumstances might 
have required. 

" Johnston must then have abandoned Harper's Ferry and 
"Winchester, and united with Beauregard, or the latter must 
have moved to the assistance of the former ; for had they 
remained separated, both Patterson and McDowell could have 
moved between them. 

" In that case, Beaureg-ard must have fallen back towards 
Richmond, and Johnston must have been isolated. If John- 
ston had fallen back upon Manassas Junction (as in fact he 
did on the 21st day of July), Patterson would have been able 
to assist McDowell at the JBattle of Bull Run ; whereas, by 
his exterior line of operations he actually gained nothing. 
Newspaper critics have attempted to throw all the blame of 
this defeat upon Patterson, and have compared him to 
Grouchy at Waterloo. From all the information we can 
obtain on this subject, we can see no parallel in the two 
cases. Grouchy made an eccentric movement from interior 
lines, thus changing his interior to an exterior position, 
leaving the great body of Blucher's army nearer to that of 
Wellington than he was to Napoleon. Nevertheless, he was 
near enough to hear the cannonading of Waterloo, and 
might have reached the field of battle in time to prevent 
the disastrous retreat, if not to save the defeat. The coun- 
try was an open one, and his army could have moved as 
rapidly as that of the enemy. On the contrary, Patterson's 
position was, from the beginning, an exterior one ; he was 
some sixty miles from the battle-field, with a strong force 
between him and McDowell. Moreover, Johnston had a 
railroad at his command, and could reach Manassas June- 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 41 

tion in a few hours; whereas, Patterson, without cars (the 
railroad being obstructed and the bridges destroyed), could 
not have reached Bull Run in less than two days, to say 
nothing of the opposition which he would have encountered 
from the army of Johnston. 

" We know nothing of the reasons why Patterson's army 
was at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, — whether his line 
of operations and his positions were of his own selection, or 
were the result of superior orders ; our criticism is based 
solely upon the movements as they occurred, without any 
intention to blame or to exculpate any one." 

I now return to mj correspondence with the General- 
in-chief. On the 23d of June, I reported as follows : 

" Headquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Hagerstown, Maryland, June 23, 1861. 

" Colonel : 

" Up to the present instant I have received from Captain 
J. Newton, Engineer Corps,, only a report of a part of his 
reconnoissance of the Maryland Heights and the ground 
adjacent, made in compliance with the injunctions of the 
General-in-chief. I hasten to give the result thus far, ex- 
pecting to-morrow evening to present the whole. 

" Captain Newton approached the Heights from this side, 
ascending over rough and steep roads, dithcult for artillery. 
The summit he found capable of defence, of ample character, 
by about 500 men. The main difficulty to be overcome is 
the supply of water, the springs, which a week since afforded 
an ample supply, having become dry. He found no water 
within a half mile of the position selected on the Heights for 
an intrenched camp. In Pleasant Valley, on the east, near 
the base of the mountain, springs are reported to abound ; 
their character will be ascertained to-morrow. Water would 
have to be hauled from this valley, and he reports the ascent 
very difficult. 

" In this valley I propose to place the force sustaining that 
on the Heights. The whole command, if the location prove 
favorable, need not exceed 2500 men. That force would 



42 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

render the position safe ; anj^thing less would invite attack. 
The following is what I have to report in relation to the 
enemy. Deserters from tKeir -ranks, some one or more of 
whom come in daily, all agree in saying that the whole of 
the force originally at Harper's Ferry (said to have been 
25,000 men) is still between Williamsport and "Winchester; 
about 8000 coming this way arrived on Friday at Martins- 
burg. The remainder are distributed in a semicircle, and on 
the route to Winchester within four hours' march of the ad- 
vance. The advance is approaching Falling Waters, under 
the command of General Jackson, who now commands the 
whole. 

" The force under Jackson controls the people of Berkeley 
County, who, I believe, are sorely oppressed, and would wel- 
come our approach. That force has become some little en- 
couraged from our not advancing, and may soon annoy us. 
If so, I shall not avoid the contest they may invite ; indeed, 
if it meets the approval of the General-in-chief, I would 
march my whole force, as soon as the batteries receive har- 
ness, upon the enemy, and drive him step by step to Win- 
chester. 

" I believe this force can in ten days rid the adjoining 
portion of Virginia of its oppressors. I may be forced to 
this course. My fear is that I may interfere with the general 
plan of the General-in-chief, and drive the enemy to the aid 
of the main body. 

" They would, however, go as fugitives, to aid in its de- 
moralization. My means of transportation are coming in 
rapidly. 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" R. Patterson, 

"Major-General, Commanding. 
" Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

"A. A. Gen. U. S. Army, Washington City." 

I here distinctly state all that I could effect '•'■ to drive 
the enemy to Winchester." Once there I had no doubt 
that he could intrench and defy me, or by striking the 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 43 

railroad, elude me, and by destroying it or removing 
the cars, prevent me from following him. 

Two days afterwards I received the following (No. 
18, p. 125, Conduct of the War) : 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

"Washington, June 25, 1861. 

" I write by mail in substance. Kemain in front of the 
enemy while he continues in force between Winchester and 
the Potomac. If yon are in superior or equal foree you may 
cross and attack him. If the enemy should retire upon his 
resources at Winchester, it is not enjoined that you should 
pursue him to that distance from your base of operations, 
without a well-grounded confidence in your continued supe- 
riority. 

" Your attention is invited to a secondary object, a com- 
bined operation on Leesburg between a portion of your 
troops and the column of Colonel Stone at, and probably 
above, the Point of Rocks, to hold that village. The enemy 
has reinforced Leesburg to sixteen hundred (1600) men, and 
may increase the number. Inquire. 

" WiNFiELD Scott. 

" Major-General Patterson." 

This gave me the permission I desired, " if I consi- 
dered myself superior or equal in force to the enemy." 
I had at this time ten thousand volunteer infantry, six 
hundred and fifty cavalry and artillery, and six guns, 
but no means of moving them. The force of the enemy 
was reported by Captain (now Major-General) Newton, 
of the U. S. Engineers, who had been for two days en- 
gaged at Harper's Ferry in obtaining intelligence, as 
consisting of fifteen thousand men, and twenty to twenty- 
four guns ; while General Cadwalader's information was 
that the enemy had twenty guns ; " they were counted 



44 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

as they passed." The accuracy of these reports is fully 
confirmed by the report of General Joseph E. Johnston, 
which has since been published. He says: 

" 1 assumed command of Harper's Ferry on the 23d of 
May. The force at that point consisted of nine regiments 
and two battalions of infantry, four companies of artillery, 
with sixteen pieces, without caissons, harness, or horses, and 
about three hundred cavalry. I was employed until the 
13th of June in continuing what had been begun by my 
predecessor, Colonel (now Major-General) Jackson, the or- 
ganization, instruction, and equipment of the troops, and 
providing means of transportation and artillery horses. On 
the morning of the 15th, the army left Harper's Ferry for 
"Winchester. The force had been increased by three regi- 
ments {i. e., the Tenth and Thirteenth Virginia and Third 
Tennessee) since the 1st of June, and encamped four miles 
beyond Charlestown." 

By the admission of the enemy, therefore, his force 
consisted of 12 regiments and 2 battalions of infantry, 
4 companies of artillery, 16 guns, 300 cavalry, which 
was increased before the 2d of July, when I crossed the 
river, according to General Johnston, " by the arrival 
of General Bee and Colonel Elzey, and the Ninth 
Georgia regiment." 

Yet the Commander-in-chief, who had • on the 25th 
given me permission to offer battle " if superior or equal 
in force," on the 27th, when he knew I had but six 
guns and no mode of moving them, telegraphs : "I had 
expected your crossing the river to-day in pursuit of the 
enemy." To this I wrote the following reply {Conduct 
of the TTar, p. 126, No. 21): 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 45 



" Hti^adquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Hagerstown, Maryland, June 28, 1861. 

" Colonel : 

" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a tele- 
gram from the General-in-chief, dated 27th instant, saying : 
' I had expected your crossing the river to-day in pursuit of 
the enemy.' 

" I infer from this that orders have been sent me to cross 
and attack the enemy. If so, I have not received them. 
Captain Newton, of the Engineers, returned at midnight, 
after two days' absence in the direction of Sharpsburg and 
Dam No. 4, and reports, on information he considers reliable, 
five thousand men from Falling Waters to Dam No. 4, four 
thousand five hundred men in the vicinity of Shepherdstown 
under Greneral Jackson, and a reserve of five thousand five 
hundred men under General Johnston, near Bunker Hill. 
He also reports twenty to twenty-four guns, and a large 
cavalry force with General Jackson, and thinks General 
Negley, whose brigade is on my left, near Sharpsburg, will 
be attacked, the river being fordable at almost every point. 
To meet this force of fifteen thousand men, with twenty-two 
guns, and nearly one thousand cavalry, I have about ten 
thousand volunteer infantry, and six hundred and fifty ca- 
valry and artillery, the latter being nearly all recruits. The 
horses are untrained, and we are still without harness for 
the battery. I have repeatedly asked for batteries, and ought 
to have one for each brigade, but have none. The only one 
fit for service sent me was the Rhode Island battery, and 
that the General-in-chief was compelled, by the necessities 
of his own position, to take from me, when most wanted, 
and within a week after it joined me. 

" I have neither cavalry nor artillery suflicient to defend 
the fords of the river between Harper's Ferry and Hancock, 
but I would much rather attack than defend, and would 
have more confidence in the result. "While I will not, on 
my own responsibility, attack without artillery and superior 
force, I will do so cheerfully and promptly if the General-in- 
chief will give me an explicit order to that effect. 



46 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

" To insure success, I respectfully but earnestly request 
that tlie troops taken from me when Washington was me- 
naced be sent to me with all speed, with a number of field 
guns equal to those of the insurgents. I will then be en- 
abled to choose my point of attack, offer battle to the enemy, 
and, I trust, drive them before me, clearing the Valley in 
front, and taking such position as the General-in-chief may 
indicate. 

" I respectfully suggest that Colonel Stone's column be 
sent me, with other reinforcements, and venture to add that 
the sooner I am reinforced with reliable troops and abundant 
fi.eld artillery the better. I am making arrangements for 
crossing the river, and will do so without waiting for orders 
or reinforcements, if I find that the strength of the enemy 
has been overrated. 

" I beg to remind the General-in-chief that the period of 
service of nearly all the troops here will expire within a 
month, and that, if we do not meet the enemy with them, 
we will be in no condition to do so for three months to come. 
The new regiments will not be fit for service before Septem- 
ber, if then, and meanwhile this whole frontier will be ex- 
posed. 

" I have got my command into as good condition as I 
could expect in so short a time. 

" Officers and men are anxious to be led against the In- 
surgents, and if the General-in-chief will give me a regiment 
of regulars and an adequate force of field artillery, I will 
cross the river and attack the enemy, unless their forces are 
ascertained to be more than two to one. 

" I beg you to assure the General-in-chief of my sincere 
desire to sustain him faithfully, and to promote, by all the 
means at my command, the success of his general plan of 
operations. 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, 

" Your obedient servant, 

" R. Patterson, 

" Major-General, Commanding. 
" Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, 

"Washington, D. C." 



IN THE YALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 47 

On the 29th of June, the harness for my battery ar- 
rived. On the 30th a reconnoissance in force was made, 
my troops were then concentrated at Williamsport, and 
on the 2d of July I crossed the Potomac with less than 
11,000 men and with one battery of six smooth-bore 
guns, to which the horses had never been attached until 
I moved, and to the sound of which they were entirely 
unaccustomed. 

After crossing the Potomac, just beyond Falling Wa- 
ters, the advance brigade of the enemy, 3500 infan- 
try, with artillery and a large cavalry force, all under 
" Stonewall" Jackson, were encountered, and after a 
sharp contest, principally with General Abercrombie's 
brigade, were forced back and driven before our troops 
several miles, the relative loss of the enemy being very 
heavy. 

The following official report of the affair was trans- 
mitted to the War Department : 



" Headquarters Department of Pennsyltania, 
Martinsburg, Virginia, July 6, 1861. 

" Sir : 

" I telegraphed my intention to cross the Potomac on the 
1st instant. I now have the honor to report my movements 
since that date. 

" I left Hagerstown on the afternoon of the 30th ult., the 
earliest day my command could take the field in a proper 
condition for active service, intending the following morning 
to enter Virginia with two columns (at Dam No. 4, and at 
Williamsport), to be united the same day at Hainesville, the 
location of the rebels. Owing to the danger and difficulty 
attending the fording at Dam No. 4, I placed all tlie force at 
Williamsport. 



48 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

" M J order of march'for the 2d instant is given in the 
accompanying circular. The advance crossed the Potomac 
at 4 A. M., all taking the main road to Martinsburg, with 
the exception of Negley's brigade, which, about one mile 
from the ford, diverged to the right, to meet the enemy 
should he come from Hedgesville, to guard our right, and 
to rejoin at Hainesville. 

" About five miles from the ford the skirmishers in front 
and on the flank suddenly became engaged with the enemy 
posted in a clump of trees. At the same time their main 
body appeared in front, sheltered by fences, timber, and 
houses. Abercrombie immediately deployed his regiments 
(First Wisconsin and Eleventh Pennsylvania) on each side of 
the road, placed Hudson's section, supported by the First 
Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry, in the road, and advanced 
to the attack against a warm fire before him. 

" The enemy being supported by artillery, resisted for 
twenty-five minutes with much determination. Lieutenant 
Hudson, after getting in position, soon silenced their guns. 

" In the meantime, Thomas's brigade rapidly advanced 
and deployed to the left flank of the enemy. The enemj-, 
seeing the movement and being pressed by Abercrombie, 
retired, hotly pursued for four miles by artillery and infantry. 

" The cavalry could not be employed, on account of nu- 
merous fences and walls crossing the country. 

" In the enemy's camp was found camp equipage, provi- 
sions, grain, &c. 

" This brush was highly creditable to our arms, winning, 
as we did, the day against a foe superior in numbers to those 
engaged on our side. 

" They were well posted, sheltered by timber, and sus- 
tained by artillery and cavalry. Our men advanced over 
open ground against a warm fire of artillery and infantry. 
I present the report of Colonels Abercrombie and Thomas, 
and Lieutenants Perkins and Hudson, and take much plea- 
sure in bearing testimony as an eye-witness to the admirable 
manner in which their commands were handled, and their 
commendations earned. 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 49 

" I also bear testimony to the efficient service, in posting 
portions of the troops and conducting them to the front and 
into action, rendered by the members of my staff present 
and on the field of battle, Colonel Porter, Captain John New- 
ton, and Lieutenant Babcock, and Majors R. Butler Price 
and Craig Biddle, who were employed conveying orders, 
also Surgeon Tripler in attending to the wounded. 

" The loss of the enemy was over sixty in killed. The 
number of wounded cannot be ascertained, as a large num- 
ber were carried oft" the field. 

."I am, sir, very respectfully, 

" Your obedient servant, 

" R. Patterson, 

" Major-General, Commanding. 
'< Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, 

"Washington, D. C." 

Subsequent operations of our forces, upon much 
grander scales, have caused this brilliant little affair to 
be forgotten. At the time, however, being the first in- 
stance that any number of our troops had been under 
fire, their gallant behavior in resisting an attack led by 
so able a commander as " Stonewall" Jackson, was a 
matter of very general congratulation and natural pride. 

On the 3d of July, the army under my command 
entered Martinsburg. There I was compelled to halt 
and send back for supplies, and to wait for Colonel 
Stone's command, ordered on the 30th of June to join 
me, which he did on the 8th of July. My means of 
transportation were utterly inadequate, without an in- 
crease of which it was impossible to advance. I had 
wagons and teams for baggage only, and none for 
a supply train. The reinforcements being without 
wagons only added to my difficulty. Not one wagon, 



50 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

horse, mule, or set of harness, was sent to me from 
Washington. All the transportation I had was fur- 
nished, under my own orders, by the energetic efforts 
of my efficient Deputy Quartermaster-General, Colonel 
Crosman. 

As an evidence of this, I insert the following, from 
other orders of the same character issued at this time 
[Report Coiidur.t of the War, vol. ii, p. 135) : 

" Headquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Martinsburq, July 8, 1861. 

" Special Orders, No. 94. 

" Division and brigade commanders Will require those 
regiments which have not reduced their number of tents to 
four common and one wall tent for each company, and one 
wall tent for other officers, at once to pack the surplus, mark 
them, and turn them in to Captain Woods, Acting Assistant 
Quartermaster, at the depot. The spare wagons which will 
thus be created must be used to carry provisions. 

" Every wagon which can be spared from transporting the 
regiments will at once be taken to Colonel Crosman, who 
is authorized to call for what he requires. 

" The commanding General calls upon every one to re- 
duce their amount of transportation, to enable him to move 
a larger force to the front, and to keep his army provisioned. 

" By order of Major-General Patterson. 

"F. J. Porter, 

"Ass't Adjutant-General." 

This deficiency of transportation, which I had anti- 
cipated on advancing on this line, now began to be a 
source of serious embarrassment. 

Immediately on the arrival of Colonel Stone I issued 
the following order to advance, the object being to attack 
the enemy at Winchester (Report, vol. ii, p. 135) : 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 51 



•' Headquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Martinsburg, Va., July 8, 1861. 

" General Order. Circular. 

" The troops will move to-morrow morning, in the follow- 
ing order : 

" The First (Thomas's) Brigade, with the Rhode Island 
Battery temporarily attached thereto, will advance by the 
Winchester turnpike, accompanied by one squadron of ca- 
valry. 

" The Seventh (Stone's) Brigade, with Perkins's Battery 
attached thereto, will take the main street of the town (by 
the Court-house), and will continue on the road parallel to 
and east of the Winchester turnpike. One company of ca- 
valry will be attached to this command. 

" The First (Cadwalader's) Division will follow the march 
of Thomas's Brigade. Doubleday's Battery will advance 
with this division, one regiment of which will be detailed 
for its guard, to accompany wherever it may be ordered. 

" The Second (Keim's) Division will pursue both routes, 
General Negley's Brigade following the march of Colonel 
Stone and Colonel Abercrombie's, and General Wynkoop's 
that of General Cadwalader. 

" The Twenty-eighth and Mneteenth JSTew York Regi- 
ments will be temporarily attached to General Keim's Divi- 
sion. 

" General Keim will detail a strong rear-guard of his divi- 
sion for the wagon train. The rear-guard will march on the 
flanks and rear of the train, and will be reinforced by a 
squadron of cavalry. 

" General Keim will detail a competent field-ofiicer to 
command the rear-guard. 

" The wagons will advance in one train in the rear of the 
troops, and will be required to keep closed. 

" The troops of the several divisions and brigades will 
keep closed. 

" By order of Major-General Patterson. 

" F. J. Porter, 

" Ass't Adjutant-General." 



52 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

About midnight the order was countermanded, as 
some of the troops that had arrived under Colonel Stone 
were reported by him so weary and footsore as to be 
quite unable, without repose, to bear the fatigue of a 
further march, and be in a condition to fight. 

On the next morning, the 9th of July, finding from 
conversation with some of my officers that their opposi- 
tion to the plan of advancing upon Winchester, made 
known by the circular, appeared to be very strong and 
decided, I was induced, before renewing the order, to 
call a council of all the division and brigade comman- 
ders, the officers of Engineers, and chiefs of the De- 
partments of Transportation and Supply. These were : 
Major-General Wm. H. Keim, Brigadier-General Cad- 
walader (now Major-General), Colonel Abercrombie 
(now Brigadier-General) , Colonel Geo. H. Thomas (now 
Major-General), Brigadier-General Negley (now Major- 
General), Colonel Stone (now Brigadier-General), Cap- 
tain Newton, U. S. Engineers "(now Major-General), 
Captain Simpson, U. S. Topographical Engineers (now 
Colonel), Captain Beckwith, Subsistence Department 
(now Colonel), Lieutenant^Colonel Crosman, Quarter- 
master's Department (now Colonel) : seven distinguished 
officers of the regular service, and three experienced 
officers of the Volunteers, the survivors of whom are all 
now in the service, where they have earned new laurels 
and high promotion. 

I had the less hesitation in consulting with these 
officers, because, after they were ordered to my com- 
mand, and I was about to attack Harper's Ferry, the 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 53 

General-in-chief, in his despatch of June 8th, already 
quoted, says : 

" I have said that we must sustain no reverse ; but this is 
not enough : a check or a drawn battle would be a victory 
to the enemy, filling his heart with joy, his ranks with men, 
and his magazines with voluntary contributions. 

" Take your measures, therefore, circumspectly ; make 
good use of your engineers and other experienced staff' offi- 
cers and generals, and attempt nothing without a clear pros- 
pect of success, as you will find the enemy strongly posted 
and not inferior to you in numbers." 

The suggestion of a council coming from these very 
" engineers, staff officers, and generals," I felt bound not 
to disregard, and, in case of disaster, I could scarcely 
say that " I had attempted nothing without a clear 
prospect of success," if my defeat had been foretold by 
the very men I was expected to consult. I submitted 
to the council my instructions, orders, and the following 
statement [Report Conduct of the War, vol. ii, pp. 85, 
86, 87) : 

" This force was collected originally to retake Harper's 
Ferry. That evacuated, it was directed to remain as long as 
Johnston remained in force in this vicinity. Threatening, 
as he was, either to move to the aid of the force attacking 
Washington, or annoying the frontier of Maryland, this 
army was permitted to cross the Potomac and offer battle. 

" If accepted, so soon as Johnston was defeated, to return 
and approach "Washington. 

" The enemy retires, for what ? Is it weakness, or a trap ? 
Can we continue to advance, and pursue if he retires ? If 
so, how far? When shall we retire ? 



54 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

" Our volunteer force will soon dwindle before us, and we 
may be left without aid. If our men go home without a 
regular battle, a good field fight, they will go home discon- 
tented, will not re-enlist, and will sour the minds of others. 
We have a long line to defend, liable at any moment to be 
cut ofi" from our base and depot, and to a blow on our flank. 

"Our forces must not be defeated, nor checked in battle, 
or meet with reverses. It would be fatal to our cause. 

" A force threatens "Washington. K we abandon our pre- 
sent position, Johnston will be available to aid. , 

" The command has been largely reinforced to enable us 
to sustain our position, to clear the valley to Winchester, to 
defeat the enemy if he accepts battle, and to be in position 
to aid General McDowell, or to move upon Washington, 
Richmond, or elsewhere, as the General-in-chief may direct. 
General Sanford, with two rifled guns and three regiments, 
will be up to-morrow. 

" Our force will then be as large as it ever will be. Under 
the prospect of losing a large portion of our force in a few 
days, by expiration of service, what shall be done?" 

The result of the deliberation is given in the following 
minute, taken at the time by Major Craig Biddle, of the 
staff {Report, vol. ii, p. 85, &c.) : 



" Minutes of Council of War, held July 9, 1861, at Martinshurg, 

Virginia. 

" Colonel Crosman, Quartermaster, thought nine hun- 
dred wagons would be sufiicient to furnish subsistence, and 
to transport ammunition to our present force. The calcula- 
tion for the original column was seven hundred wagons, of 
which five hundred were on hand and two hundred expected. 
The great difficulty will be to obtain forage for the animals, 
the present consumption being twenty-six tons daily. 

" Captain Beckwith, Commissary. The question of sub- 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 55 

sistence is here a question of transportation. Thus far no 
reliance has been phxced on the adjacent country. A day's 
march ahead would compel a resort to it. As far as known 
those supplies would be quite inadequate. 

" Captain Simpson, Topographical Engineers. The diffi- 
culty of our present position arises from the great facility 
the enemy has to concentrate troops at Winchester from 
Manassas Junction. By the railroad, twelve thousand men 
could be sent there in a day, and again sent back to Man- 
assas. Our forces should combine with the forces at Wash- 
ington. 

" Captain Newton, Engineers. Our present position is a 
very exposed one. General Johnston can keep us where 
we are as long as he pleases, and at any time make a demon- 
stration on our rear. Our whole line is a false one. We 
have no business here, except for the purpose of making a 
demonstration. lie threatens us now. We should be in a 
position to threaten him. We should go to Charlestown, 
Harper's Ferry, Shepherdstown, and flank him. 

" Colonel Stone. It is mainly a question for the staff. 
Our enemy has great facility of movement, and to extend 
our line would be accompanied with great danger. John- 
ston should be threatened from some other point. We 
might leave two regiments here, two guns at Shepherdstown, 
and proceed to Charlestown, and threaten from that point. 

" General ISTegley, ditto to Captain Newton. 

" Colonel Thomas approves of a flank movement to 
Charlestown. 

" Colonel Abercrombie, the same. 

" General Keim, the same. 

" General Cadwalader opposed to a forward movement." . 

The wisdom of this decision of the council held on 
the 9 th was confirmed in my mind by the receipt of the 
following telegram from the General-in-chief two days 
afterwards (see Conduct of the War, vol. ii, p. 86) : 



56 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 



" "War Department, 
Washington, July 11, 1861. 

" Majok-General Patterson, 

" Martinsburg, Virginia. 

" The author of the following is known, and he believes 
it authentic : 

" ' Washington, July 9, 1861. 

" ' The plan of operations of the Secession army in Virginia 
contemplates the reverse of the proceedings and movements 
announced in the Express of yesterday and Saturday. A 
schedule that has come to light meditates a stand and an en- 
gagement by Johnston, when he shall have drawn Patterson 
sufficiently far back from the river to render impossible his 
retreat across it on being vanquished, and an advance then by 
Johnston and Wise conjointly upon McClellan, and, after the 
conquest of him, a march in this direction, to unite in an 
attack upon the Federal forces across the Potomac, with the 
army under Beauregard at Manassas Junction, and the wing 
of that army, the South Carolina regiments chiefly, now nine 
(9) miles from Alexandria. Success in each of these three 
several movements is anticipated, and thereby not only the 
possession of the capital is thought to be assured, but an 
advance of the Federal troops upon Richmond prevented. 
The plan supposes that this success will give the Confederate 
cause such prestige, and inspire in it such faith, as will insure 
the recognition of its Government abroad, and at the same 
time so impair confidence in the Federal Government as to 
render it impossible for it to procure loans abroad, and very 
difficult for it to raise means at home. Real retreats, which 
have been anticipated, it will be seen are, by this plan, alto- 
gether ignored. According to it, fighting and conquest are 
the orders.' 

" E. D. TOAVNSEND, 

"Asst. Adjt. Genl." 

This paper, transmitted from the headquarters of the 
army, speaks for itself. 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 57 

That this was the plan agreed upon by the Confederate 
generals there is no doubt ; and it was a judicious one. 
My information of a similar kind had come from various 
quarters. My most experienced officers of the regular 
service, with whom I fully and freely consulted, Co- 
lonels George H. Thomas, Abercrombie, and Crosman, 
Major Fitz John Porter, Captains Newton, Beckwith, 
and many others, men of long service, merit, and great 
experience, all concurred in the opinion that I was too 
far advanced at Martinsburg ; that Johnston had fallen 
back for no other purpose than to lead me on ; that he 
had a trap set somewhere, and that, if not very cautious, 
I should fall into it. 

Each of these officers, not only approved warmly of 
the management of my command, but opposed, both in 
and out of council, a further advance. With their op- 
position to an advance well known, five of the number 
have since been made general officers. 

The enemy were at Winchester intrenched. The 
phrase " intrenchments," at the beginning of the war, 
was very much misunderstood, and was popularly sup- 
posed to refer to permanent works. Experience has 
shown, on several occasions, that earthworks thrown up 
in a night have defied the efforts of the best troops. 

The superiority of the enemy at Winchester in men 
and guns as well as in position, was well known. The 
information was obtained from Union men who had 
been there, from prisoners, from deserters, and from 
other sources, all agreeing on an average of about forty 
thousand men and over sixty guns. Captain Wellmore, 



58 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

belonging to a Maryland regiment, taken prisoner at 
Charlestown by a party sent by me from Harper's Ferry, 
gave forty thousand. A gentleman from Berkeley 
County, of high respectability, serving under Johnston 
as an unwilling Virginia volunteer in Jackson's Brigade, 
at the battle of Falling Waters, subsequently gave the 
following statement, taken down by General Negley, 
and by him given to me : 

" General Jackson retreated with his brigade, consisting 
then of four regiments and four pieces of artillery (Captain 
Pendleton), to Big Spring, three and a half miles south of 
Martinsburg. General Johnston arrived at Darkesville the 
same night with about fourteen thousand men. He was 
then reinforced by one regiment and one battery (four guns) 
flying artillery. General Jackson retreated to that point. 
The army made a stand there for four days ; they then re- 
treated to "Winchester. When we arrived there, we found 
fortifications commenced by the militia. All the army 
there assisted, and in two days, the city was fortified all 
around, within two miles of the suburbs, with intrench- 
ments. Reinforcements commenced pouriug in. Ten 42- 
pounders were placed, masked, around the fortifications ; 
also, artificial thickets planted for riflemen. The force 
consisted of forty-two thousand, including four thousand 
militia. General Johnston then received a despatch, as 
read to the men, that General Patterson was out of the 
way ; that he had gone to get in Beauregard's rear, and that 
JeflT. Davis had ordered him to cut oft' General Patterson, in 
order to save the country; that General Beauregard had 
been attacked by an overwhelming force. General John- 
ston's ai*my moved at 1 o'clock, p.m., Thursday, consisting 
of nine brigades, with fifty-two pieces of flying artillery, 
including three ten-inch columbiads, represented to me as 
such. Among the artillery was a detachment of the Wash- 
ington Artillery, consisting of eight guns, four of which were 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 59 

rifled cannon. General Johnston took with him thirty-five 
thousand men, leaving the militia and volunteers, to the 
number of seven thousand, in Winchester." 

Mr. McDonald, a reporter, gave the following state- 
ment, taken down by General Cadwalader, and by him 
given to me : 

" General Johnston's force at Winchester was forty-two 
thousand men, infantry, artillery, and cavalry; of which, 
eight hundred were Virginia cavalry, under Colonel Stuart, 
and three hundred from Southern States. Forty regiments, 
thirty-five thousand men, left Winchester, at 1 o'clock p.m., 
on Thursday, by order of General Beauregard; took the 
road to Berry's Ford, on the Shenandoah, thirteen and a half 
miles, over the Blue liidge to Piedmont Station, on the Ma- 
nassas Gap Railroad, fifteen miles, making twenty-eight and 
a half miles, requiring two days' march. Freight and passen- 
ger cars had been hauled over the road, on their own wheels, 
to Strasburg last week, and on them Johnston's forces were 
expected to be transported, on the Manassas Railroad, from 
Piedmont to Manassas Junction, thirty-eight to forty miles. 
There remained at Winchester seven thousand troops until 
Saturday afternoon, when they left for Strasburg, on their 
way to Manassas, except about two thousand five hundred of 
the militia of the neighboring counties, disbanded and sent 
home. A large quantity of arms in boxes was sent to Stras- 
burg. The Virginia cavalry remained (under Colonel Stuart), 
and went to Berrysville to observe the movements of Gene- 
ral Patterson's column. The rest of the cavalry went with 
General Johnston. They had at Winchester sixty-two pieces 
of artillery in position in the fortifications; about ten 42- 
pounders (some, they thought, were columbiads) were left. 
The remainder were taken by General Johnston. A detach- 
ment of the Washington Artillery, from ITew Orleans, had 
eight heavy guns, of which four were 32-pounders. These 
were hauled by twenty-eight horses each ; the rest (smaller 
guns) by six and four horses each. Part, if not all of them, 
were brass rifled guns. The fortifications surrounded Win- 



60 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

Chester, except to the southward, upon the high ground ; 
very heavy earthworks, made w^ith bags and barrels tilled 
with earth, &c. In front of the breastworks deep trenches 
were dug, communicating below with inside of the works. 
The guns were all masked with artificial thickets of ever- 
greens, which were intended in some cases to be used as 
ambuscades for riflemen and sharpshooters. Among the 
regiments was one of Kentucky riflemen, armed with heavy 
bowie-knives. They refused to take more than one round 
of cartridges. They proposed to place themselves in the 
bushes for assault. All the fences had been levelled for 
miles in front of "Winchester. The fortifications extended 
two and a half miles. The trees had been felled between 
Bunker Hill and Winchester, to impede an advance. Fif- 
teen hundred sick at Winchester, confined with measles, 
dysentery, and typhoid fever. Prisoners taken from our 
column were sent to Richmond. Wise had been recalled, 
it is said, with his troops, from Western Virginia. Beau- 
regard and Davis had done it in opposition to General Lee's 
advice." 

Mr. Lackland, brother of Colonel Lackland, residing 
a short distance from Cbarlestown, and just returned 
from Winchester, stated, July 20th, 1861, that Johnston 
had at that place, 

" 2 regiments from Kentucky, Duncan and Pope, . . 1,800 

2 regiments from Tennessee, 1,800 

5 regiments from Alabama, strong, 4,500 

5 regiments from Georgia, strong, ..... 4,600 

1 regiment from North Carolina, 1,000 

5 regiments from Mississippi, ...... 4,500 

2 regiments from Maryland, 1,200 

Several regiments from Virginia, 10,000 

Militia from Virginia, ....... 5,000 

One regiment of cavalry, 600 

Several batteries, 700 

35,200 

" On Wednesday, the 18th, at 2 p.m., he commenced his 
movement southeast. Number taken, 30,000 Confederate 
troops ; number left, 5200 militia." 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 61 

These statements, with many others, taken by differ- 
ent officers, from different persons, at different times 
and places, agree very much in the main facts. 

Like most other reports, these were doulJtless exag- 
gerated, and required, as they received, due allowance. 
We are not, however, to rush into the. other extreme? 
and believe nothing, because the narrator may be sup- 
posed to have exceeded the truth. "We have in the 
present case a most valuable witness, one whose interest 
it was to underrate his own force and overrate mine. 
General Johnston himself Stating my force at thirty 
thousand, he alleges his inferiority in men as a reason 
for not attacking me, and would therefore, to justify 
himself, make his force as small as possible. By his 
official report he had, on the 23d of May, 9 regiments 
and 2 battalions of infantry, 4 companies of artillery, 16 
pieces of artillery, 300 cavalry. To this were added, on 
the 13th of June, 3 regiments of infantry, and, on the 
15th of July, 8 regiments of infantry, with 2500 militia 
to man the fortifications. Of intrenchments he says 
that, after my first advance across the Potomac, on the 
16th of June, " Major Whiting was ordered to jDlan de- 
fensive works, and to have some heavy guns on navy 
carriages mounted. About twenty-five hundred militia, 
under Brigadier-General Carson, were called out to man 
them." 

General Scott, also, in a despatch addressed to my 
successor. General Banks, which I received before I was 
relieved, gives the following information as to the num- 



62 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

ber of guns which Johnston had left behind him at Win- 
chester {Report, vol. ii, p. 140) : 

" War Department, 
Washington, July 23, 11.30 p.m. 

" The following information has just been received from 

A. ^. Rankin, editor of the Republican and Transcript : 

There are nine* 32-pounders, four 44-pounders, and two 

6-pounders, and one thousand stand of arms at Winchester, 

with but five hundred men, raw militia, to guard the same. 

There are also one thousand tents, and a very large amount 

of powder, balls, and shells. 

" WiNFiELD Scott. 

" Major-General Banks, 

"Headquarters Army, Harper's Ferry." 

General Abercrombie, a regular officer of more than 
forty years' service, writes me from Winchester on the 
17th of March, 1862: 

" I rode over the ground occupied by Johnston in July, 
and, after a careful examination, I found that I had no reason 
to change my opinion as to the course you adopted. 

" The works themselves were of no great strength, but 
the judicious disposition made of them, the favorable cha- 
racter of the ground, size and number of guns, and numerical 
strength of force, ought to have defeated double the number. 

" I think you may rely on this : Johnston had twenty-six 
thousand volunteers that were mustered into the service, 
and between six and seven thousand of what fliey call militia, 
making some thirty-two or thirty-three thousand men. The 
trenches extend some four or five miles. They commience 
at the turnpike leading to Charlestown, due east from Win- 
chester, and run to the base of the hills west of the town, 
and at every few hundred paces we found platforms for 
heavy pivot guns, some of them rifled, so I am told. On 
the hills alluded to, some very heavy guns were admirably 
arranged, and commanded the whole valley. These also 
were made to traverse in every direction. Most of these 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 63 

earthworks were constructed with regard to the Martins- 
burg route. On the 16th, Johnston had his whole force 
under arms, in battle order, and waited some hours, under 
the impression that you were approaching from Bunker Hill 
to attack him, and has since said he regrets not having 
attacked you, 

" General Johnston had not less than thirty-two thousand 
men, a very strong position, and between sixty and seventy 
guns, eleven of them pivot and of heavy calibre. 

" I have conversed with a number of intelligent persons 
on the subject, and all agree very nearly as to the strength 
of Johnston's force and number of guns, and my own obser- 
vations and personal inspection (of the abandoned earth- 
works) satisfy me of the correctness of their statements." 

I will here take occasion to say that my force was 
always greatly overestimated, not only by the public, 
but apparently by the General-in-chief himself. There 
were twelve regiments ordered to join me, one Delaware 
and three New Jersey on the 24th of May, two New 
York on the SOtli of May, two Ohio and two Northern 
regiments on the 4th of June, and two Pennsylvania 
on the 10th of June, but they never did so. I was, 
therefore, probably operating w^itli a force less by twelve 
regiments than the General-in-chief intended : a fact 
sufficient to explain his exaggerated ideas of the strength 
of my command. My largest force was accumulated at 
Martinsburg, about eighteen thousand two hundred 
men. When I marched from there, I had to leave two 
regiments, taking about sixteen thousand eight hundred 
men with me, and, deducting from them the sick, the 
rear and wagon guards, I could not have gone into 
action with more than thirteen thousand, and at the 



64 NARRA.TIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

time Johnston marched from Winchester I could not 
have taken into action ten thousand men. 

If I had been defeated a large portion of my army 
would have probably been destroyed and the others made 
prisoners of war. The affair would have been more 
disastrous than Bull Run, for the Potomac was behind 
me and I had no reserves to fall back upon. . The enemy, 
flushed with two victories instead of one, with no army 
in position to check them, might have been in possession 
of Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, within five 
days. The reason assigned for not advancing on Wash- 
ington by the commander of the Confederates in his 
official report after Bull Run, was the fact of my army 
being intact and ready to advance. This Shenandoah 
Valley, through which the enemy have since twice pene- 
trated into Pennsylvania, I was always loath to leave un- 
guarded. On the 20th of June, when about to cross the 
Potomac, I had written to General McCall as follows : 
{Report, vol. ii, p. 82) : 

"Headquarters, Departmekt of Pennstlvania, 
Hagerstown, June 26, 1861. 

" My dear General : 

" If I can get permission to go over into Virginia, I intend 
to cross the river and offer battle to the insurgents. As the 
regulars and Rhode Island regiment and battery have been 
taken from me, I will require all the force now here, and 
must leave the Pennsylvania line unguarded. Please in- 
form me how many men you can throw forward, and how 
soon. 

" Very respectfully and truly yours, 

" R. Patterson." 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 65 

To which Major-General McCall replied as follows 
(p. 82) : 

" Harrisburg, Sunday, June 30, 1861. 

" My dear General : 

" On my return from Pittsburg tins morning, I find your 
note of the 26th instant, informing me of your purpose to 
cross the river and offer battle to the insurgents, and asking 
what force I can throw forward on the Pennsylvania line. 

" In reply I have to say that the only force (one regiment 
rifles, and one infantry, with a section of artillery) of my 
command as yet armed and equipped, has been pushed for- 
ward to the support of Colonel Wallace at Cumberland, and 
for the protection of our border settlers in that direction ; 
the other regiments are without clothing, arms, or equip- 
ments, still, notwithstanding my efforts to fit them for the 
field. You will therefore perceive how impossible it will 
be for me, although I much regret it, to comply with your 
request. 

" With great regard, very truly yours, 

" George A. McCall." 

It will be seen from the letter of General McCall that 
with all his efforts, he had but two regiments and a sec- 
tion of artillery fit for the field, and this force, under 
Colonel Charles J. Biddle, was then beyond Bedford, 
"for the support of Colonel Wallace at Cumberland, 
and for the protection of our border settlers in that 
direction." I was thus made responsible for our entire 
frontier from Cumberland to Edwards' Ferry, while I 
had not cavalry or artillery enough to guard the fords 
between Hancock and Harper's Ferry. These were 
some of the reasons which prevented me from attack- 
ing the enemy at Winchester. My instructions were, 
" If the enemy were to retire upon his resources at Win- 

5 



66 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

Chester, it is not enjoined that you pursue him to that 
distance from your base of operations without a well- 
grounded confidence in your continued superiority." 

Will any fair-minded man say, that I could under 
these circumstances have entertained any such confi- 
dence ? 

But what was to be gained by an attack, the object 
being to detain Johnston ? 

I had been anxious to go to Leesburg, where, if John- 
ston attempted to elude me, I could reach McDowell as 
soon as he could join Beauregard. This, however, was 
not permitted, but I was kept on a false line, where I 
could no more prevent Johnston by force from going to 
Manassas than an army at Washington could prevent 
one at Philadelphia going to New York. Neither could 
I follow him, for he had a railroad behind him which he 
could use and then destroy. Johnston says, in his 
official report, " I proceeded to Winchester. There the 
army was in position to oppose either McClellan from 
the west, or Patterson from the northeast, and to form 
a j unction with General Beauregard when necessary." 

After the conference with my officers, I wrote to the 
General-in-chief, as follows : 

" Headquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Martinsburg, July 9, 1861; 

" Colonel : 

"I have received the telegrams of the General-in-chief, 
notifying of the additional regiments sent to me. Colonel 
Stone and the Nineteenth and Twenty-eighth New York re- 
giments arrived yesterday. General Sanford, with the Fifth 
and Twelfth New York regiments, will join to-morrow. 

" Since I last addressed you, I have made no movements ; 



IN THE VALLEY OP THE SHENANDOAH. 67 

in fact, have been prevented by the necessity of sending all 
my wagons to the rear, to obtain provisions for a few days 
in advance and to bring up troops. The commissary has 
supplies (with those in hands of troops) for about two days. 
Though the quartermaster has spared no exertion, and his 
agents have been very active, he has not as yet been able to 
provide a supply train for the command. I am, therefore, 
much restricted in my movements, being compelled after 
three days' advance to send back for provisions. The diffi- 
culty will increase as I advance ; indeed, I am now almost at 
a stand. Instead of receiving aid from the inhabitants, I 
find myself in an enemy's country, where our opponents can 
procure supplies and we nothing, except by seizure. Even 
information is studiously kept from us. Supplies, especially 
provisions, are very scarce, and not even one day's rations 
can be relied upon. The supply of grain also is very limited. 
Under these circumstances, I respectfully present to the Gene- 
ral-in-chief the following plan, which with my present \dew8 
I desire to carry into operation so soon as I can do so with 
safety, and the necessity for following Johnston ceases. I 
propose to move this force to Charlestown, from which point 
I can more easily strike Winchester, march to Leesburg 
when necessary, open communication to a depot to be estab- 
lished at Harper's Ferry, and occupy the main avenue of 
supply to the enemy. My base will then be some ^even 
miles nearer, more easily reached by road, and my line of 
communication rendered more secure than at present. I 
can establish communication with the Maryland shore by 
a bridge of boats. In this way I can more easily approach 
you, and the movement, I think, will tend to relieve Lees- 
burg and vicinity of some of its oppressors. My present 
location is a very bad one, in a military point of view, and 
from it I cannot move a portion of the force without exposing 
what remains to be cut off. 

" General Sanford informs me by letter that he has for me 
a letter from you. I hope it will inform me when you will 
put your column in motion against Manassas, and when you 
wish me to strike. The enemy retired in succession fi-om 



68 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

Darkesville and Bunker Hill to Stevenson's Station, a few- 
miles from Winchester. There he has halted, and report 
says is intrenching. His design evidently is to draw this 
force on as far as possible from its base, and then to cut my 
line, or to attack with large reinforcements from Manassas. 
As I have already stated, I cannot advance far, and if I could, 
I think the movement very imprudent. When you make 
your attack I expect to advance and ofter battle. If the 
enemy retires, shall not pursue. I am very desirous to know 
when the General-in-chief wishes me to approach Winchester. 
If the notice does not come in any other way, I wish you 
would indicate the day by telegraph thus : ' Lei me hear 

from you on .' 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, 

" Your obedient servant, 

"R. Patterson, 

" Major-General, Commanding. 
"Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army, 

"Washington, D. C." 

On the 13th I received the following telegram from 
General Scott : 

"Washington, July 12, 1861, 1.30p.m. 
" Gro where you propose in your letter of the 9th instant. 
Should that movement cause the enemy to retreat upon 
Manassas via Strasburg, to follow him at this distance would 
seem hazardous, whereas the route from Charlestown via 
Keyes' Ferry, Hillsboro', and Leesburg, towards Alexandria, 
with the use of the canal on the other side of the river for 
transportation, may be practicable. Consider this sugges- 
tion well, and, except in extreme case, do not recross the 
Potomac with more than a sufficient detachment for your 
supplies on the canal. Let me hear from you on Tuesday. 
Write often when en route. 

" WiNFiELD Scott. 

" Major-General Patterson, 

" Martinsburg, Virginia." 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 69 

This gave me the desired permission to go to Charles- 
town; and the phrase, "Let me hear from you on 
Tuesday," announced that General McDowell's attack 
was to begin on that day. 

On the next day, the orders were substantially reite- 
rated in the following despatch : 

" "Washington, July 13, 1861. 
" I telegraphed you yesterday, if not strong enough to beat 
the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to 
detain him in the valley of Winchester ; but if he retreats in 
force towards Manassas, and it be hazardous to follow him, 
then consider the route via Keyes' Ferry, Leesburg, &c. 

" WiNFiELD Scott. 

" General K. Patterson." 

I did not consider myself " strong enough to beat the 
enemy," nor did any officer with whom I consulted ; I 
determined, therefore, ''to make demonstrations so as 
to detain Johnston in the valley of Winchester" at the 
time indicated. This gave me no opportunity to change 
my base promptly, and the attempt to do so I thought 
might send Johnston to Manassas at the very time the 
General-in-chief desired him to be kept at Winchester, 
to wit, on the following Tuesday. I therefore postponed 
my movement to Charlestown until after that day. 
This I considered a fulfilment of my orders to the very 
letter, and as I reported every movement I was making 
fully to headquarters, as appears by the following letters, 
I could at any moment have been stopped by telegraph, 
had it been desired that I should act differently [Report, 
vol. ii, pp. 132, 138, 139): 



70 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN" 

" Headquarters Department OF Pennsylvania, 
Martinsburg, July 14th, 1861. 

*' Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army, 
" Washington City. 

" Colonel : i have tlius far succeeded in keeping in tliis 
vicinity the command under General Johnston, who is now 
pretending to be engaged in fortifying at Winchester, but 
prepared to retire beyond striking distance if I shall ad- 
vance far. 

" To-morrow I advance to Bunker Hill, preparatory to the 
other movement. If an opportunity offers I shall attack, 
but unless I can rout shall be careful not to set him in full 
retreat upon Strasburg. 

" I have arranged for the occupation of Harper's Ferry, 
opposite which point I have directed provisions to be sent. 

" Many of the three months' volunteers are very restless 
at the prospect of being retained over their time. This fact 
will cause you to hear from me soon in the direction of 
Charlestown. Want of ample transportation for supplies 
and baggage has prevented my moving earlier in the direc- 
tion I desired. 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" R. Patterson, 

" Major-General, Commanding." 

" Headquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Bunker Hill, July 16th, 1861. 

" Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army, 
" Washington City. 

" Colonel : I have the honor to report, for the informa- 
tion of the General-in-chief, my advance and arrival at this 
place yesterday, opposed only by a body of six hundred 
cavalry, of which one was killed and five taken prisoners. 

" To-morrow I move upon Charlestown. A reconnois- 
sance shows the Winchester road blocked by fallen trees 
and fences placed across it, indicating no confidence in the 
large force now said to be at Winchester. I send you a 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 71 

sketch, prepared by Captain Simpson, of the works said to 
have been erected in the vicinity of Winchester. 

" Preparations have ah^eady been commenced to occupy 
and hold Harper's Ferry with the three years' troops. If 
the General-in-chief desires to retain that place (and I advise 
it never to be evacuated), I desire to be at once informed 
by telegraph. 

" I have to report that the term of service of a very large 
portion of this force will expire in a few days. From an 
undercurrent expression of feeling, I am confident that many 
will be inclined to lay down their arms the day the term 
expires. With such a feeling existing, any active operations 
cannot be thought of, until they are replaced by three years' 
men. Those whose terms expire this week, and will not 
remain, I shall arrange to send off by Harper's Ferry ; those 
for Philadelphia via Baltimore, those for Harrisburg via 
Hagerstown. 

" K Harper's Ferry is to be held, after securing that, I shall, 
if the General-in-chief desires, advance with the remainder 
of the troops via Leesburg, provided the force under John- 
ston does not remain at Winchester after the success which 
I anticipate from General McDowell. 

" I wish to be advised if these propositions meet with the 
approval of the General-in-chief. 

" The Wisconsin regiments are without arms and accou- 
trements, which I have directed the commander of the 
Frankford Arsenal to provide. 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, your, obedient servant, 

" R. Patterson, 

"Major-General, Commanding." 

" Headquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Charlestown, Virginia, July 17, 186L 

" The terms of service of the Pennsylvania troops (eighteen 
regiments) expire within seven days, commencing to-mor- 
row. I can rely on none of them renewing service. I must 
be at once provided with efficient three years' men, or with- 
draw to Harper's Ferry. 

" Shall I occupy permanently Harper's Ferry, or with- 



72 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

draw entirely? I wrote yesterday on this subject, and now 
wish to be informed of the intentions of the General-in-chief. 
My march to-day was without opposition or incident of im- 
portance. The country has been drained of men. This 
place has been a depot for supplies for the force at Winchester, 
and the presence of the army is not welcome. 

" R. Patterson, 

"Major-General, Commanding. 
" Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army, 

" Washington, D. C." 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

"Washington, July 17, 1861. 

" I have nothing official from you since Sunday, but am 
glad to learn, through Philadelphia papers, that you have ad- 
vanced. Do not let the enemy amuse and^ delay you with a 
small force in front while he reinforces the Junction with 
his main body. 

" McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy be- 
yond Fairfax Court-house. The Junction will probably be 
carried to-morrow. 

" WiNFiELD Scott, 

" General Patterson, 

" Commiinding U. S. Forces, Harper's Ferry." 

To this I replied as follows : 

" Headquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Charlestown, Virginia, July 18, 1861. 

" Telegram of to-day received. The enemy has stolen no 
march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and by 
threats and reconnoissance in force, caused him to be rein- 
forced. I have accomplished more in this respect than the 
General-in-chief asked, or could well be expected in face of 
an enemy far superior in numbers, with no line of communi- 
cation to protect. 

" In future, Post-office, Sandy Hook. 

" R. Patterson, 

"Major-General, Commanding. 
" Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army, 

" Washinarton." 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 73 

On the same day I received the following : 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, July 18, 18G1. 

"I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy ; 
if not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or at least had 
occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have 
been at least his equal, and I suppose, superior in number. 
Has he not stolen a march and sent reinforcements toward 
Manassas Junction ? A week is enough to win a victory. 
The time of volunteers counts from the day mustered into 
the service of the United States. You must not retreat 
across the Potomac. K necessary, when abandoned by the 
short term volunteers, intrench somewhere and wait for re- 
inforcements. 

" WiNFiELD Scott. 

" Major-General Patterson, 

" Commanding U. S. Forces." 

To this I replied : 

" Headquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Charlestown, Virginia, 

July 18, 1861, 1.30 A. M. 

" Telegram of date received. Mine of to-night gives the 
condition of ray command. Some regiments have given 
warning not to serve an hour over time. To attack under 
such circumstances against the greatly superior force at 
Winchester is most hazardous. My letter of the 16th gives 
you further information. Shall I attack ? 

" R. Patterson, 

" Major-General, Commanding. 
"Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

" Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army, 

"Washington, D. C." 

(To same, If. m.) 

" I have succeeded, in accordance with the wishes of the 
General-in-chief, in keeping General Johnston's force at 
"Winchester. A reconnoissance in force on Tuesday caused 
him to be largely reinforced from Strasburg. Witli the ex- 



74 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

isting feeling and determination of the three months' men to 
return home, it would be ruinous to advance, or even to stay 
here without immediate increase of force to replace them. 
They will not remain. 

" I have ordered the brigades to assemble this afternoon, 
and shall Qiake a formal appeal to the troops to stay a few 
days until I can be reinforced. Many of the regiments are 
without shoes; the Government refuses to furnish them; 
the men have received no pay ; and neither officers or sol- 
diers have money to purchase with. Under these circum- 
stances I cannot ask or expect the three months' volunteers 
to stay longer than one week. Two companies of Pennsyl- 
vania volunteers were discharged to-day and ordered home. 
I to-day place additional force at Harper's Ferry and esta- 
blish communication with Maryland. I sent Captain New- 
ton to prepare for its defence. 

" R. Patterson, 

"Major-General, Commanding." 

Thus, from Charlestown on Thursday, the 18th of 
July, three days before the battle of Bull Run, at 1.30 
A.M., twelve hours before any part of General Johnston's 
command left Winchester for Manassas, I telegraphed 
General Scott my opinion of the probable result of an 
attack on Winchester, and asked, "Shall I attack ?" 

To this no answer was returned, and I was left in 
utter ignorance of General McDowell's movements from 
Wednesday, July 17th, until Monday, the 22d, when I 
first heard of the disastrous result through the news- 
papers. If the Commander-in-chief, who was perfectly 
acquainted with my condition, desired me to attack, he 
here had an opportunity of directing it ; with his order, 
I would cheerfully have advanced, let my force have 
been what it would and the result what it might. And 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 75 

if General Scott had desired me to join him at Manassas, 
an order to me at that time would have effected it, and 
I could have been there, if ordered on that day, as soon 
or sooner than Johnston. 

On the same day the following letter was also sent : 

" Headquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Charlestown, Virginia, July 18, 1861. 

" Colonel : 

" I arrived at this place on the 17tli instant. l!Tothing of 
importance occurred on the march. The principal inhabi- 
tants left some days since, anticipating its occupation by the 
Federal troops. It was, till our arrival, the location of a 
band of Secession militia, engaged in pressing into the ser- 
vice the young men of the country. I have to acknowledge 
the receipt of two telegrams from the General-in-chief, of the 
17th and 18th instant, both looking to a movement and 
attack upon Winchester. A state of affairs existed which 
the General-in-chief is not aware of, though in some re- 
spects anticipated by his instructions, that if I found the 
enemy too strong to attack, to threaten and make demonstra- 
tions to retain him at Winchester. I more than carried out 
the wishes of the General-in-chief in this respect. Before I 
left Martinsburg, I was informed of a large increase in John- 
ston's command, and of the visit to Winchester of the lead- 
ing members of the Confederate army. Just before General 
McDowell was to strike, I advanced to Bunker Hill, causing 
surprise, and I have since learned an additional increase of 
force. On Tuesday I sent out a reconnoitring party to- 
wards Winchester. It drove the enemy's pickets, and caused 
the army to be formed in line of battle, anticipating an 
attack from my main force. This party found the road 
barricaded and blocked by fallen trees. The following day 
I left for this place. 

" Before marching from Martinsburg, I heard of the mutter- 
ings of many of the volunteer regiments, and their expressed 
determination not to serve one hour after their term of ser- 



76 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

vice should expire. I anticipated a better expression of 
opinion as we approached the enemy, and hoped to hear of 
a wilhngness to remain a week or ten days. I was disap- 
pointed ; and when I prepared for a movement to the front, 
by an order for the men to carry two days' provisions in 
their haversacks, I was assailed by earnest remonstrance 
against being detained over their term of service, complaints 
from officers of want of shoes arid other clothing, all throw- 
ing obstacles in the way of active operations. Indeed, I 
found I should, if I took Winchester, be without men, and 
be forced to retreat, thus losing the fruits of victory. Under 
these circumstances, neither I nor those on whom I could 
rely, could advance with any confidence. I am, therefore, 
now here, with a force which will be dwindling away very 
rapidly. I to-day appealed almost in vain to the regiments 
to stand by the country for a week or ten days. The men 
are longing for their homes, and nothing can detain them. 
I sent Captain Newton to-day to Harper's Ferry to arrange 
for defence and re-establish communication with Maryland, 
and the Massachusetts regiments. The Third Wisconsin 
will soon be there. Lieutenant Babcock has been at Sandy 
Hook several days trying to get the canal in operation, pre- 
pare the entrance to the ford, putting in operation a ferry, 
and reconstructing the bridge. Depots for all supplies will 
soon be established, and there I shall cause to be turned in 
the camp equipage, &c., of the regiments, and to that place 
I shall withdraw if I find my force so small as to render my 
present position unsafe. I cannot intrench sufficiently to 
defend this place against a large force. 

" I shall direct the regiments to be sent to Harrisburg and 
Philadelphia, to be mustered out by Captain Hastings, Major 
Ruff", and Captain Wliarton. 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" R. Pattekson, 

" Major-General, Commanding. 
" Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

" Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army, 

"Washington, D. C." 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 77 

" Hkadquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Charlestown, Virginia, July 19, 1861. 

"Almost all the three months' volunteers refuse to serve 
an hour over their time, and, except three regiments which 
will stay ten days, the most of them are without shoes or 
pants. I am compelled to send them home, many of them 
at once, some to Ilarrisburg, some to Philadelphia, one to 
Indiana; and, if not otherwise directed by telegraph, I shall 
send to the place of muster, to which I request rolls may be 
sent, and Captain Hastings, Major Ruff, and Captain Whar- 
ton ordered to muster them out. They cannot march, and, 
unless a paymaster goes to them, they will be indecently 
clad, and have just cause of complaint. 

" R. Patterson, 

"Major-General, Commanding. 
"Adjutant-General U. S. Army, 

"Washington, D. C." 

I succeeded then in detaining Johnston up to the after- 
noon of Thursday, the 18th, and no portion of his force 
arrived on the field of battle at Manassas until the after- 
noon of Sunday, the 21st, so that Johnston was kept 
from joining Beaure^gard not only on " Tuesday," or, 
" the early part of next week," but during the entire 
week. That the battle of Manassas was by that time 
fought and won by our troops I had no doubt. General 
Scott had telegraphed me on Wednesday, the 1 7tli : 

" McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy be- 
yond Fairfax Court-house; the Junction will probably be 
carried to-morrow." 

So that knowing Johnston to be still in my front, and 
that it would take him three days to reach Manassas, I 
felt confident that everything was progressing in accor- 
dance with the plans of the General-in-chief. Instead, 



78 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

however, of " the Junction being carried to-morrow" 
(Thursday), there was not even an attack made upon 
it until Sunday, the 21st, and then late in the day. . Of 
all of which I was profoundly ignorant, never having 
received an intimation of it from any source whatever, 
so that I assumed, and had a right to assume, that if the 
General-in-chief told me he would fight on Tuesday, the 
16th, and on the 17th had told me he had driven the 
enemy beyond a certain point, and would probably com- 
plete the operation on the next day, that it was his 
duty to inform me if he had not done it, otherwise, I 
must of course infer that he had done it. More especially, 
when it was in his power to have communicated with 
me by telegraph. 

I informed the General-in-chief of Johnston's depar- 
ture to join Beauregard in ample time to enable him 
to abstain from delivering battle, if he desired to do so. 

I telegraphed as follows on the 20th of July : 

" Headquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Charlestown, Virginia, July 20, 1861. 

" With a portion of his force Johnston left Winchester, 

by the road to Millwood, on the afternoon of the 18tli ; his 

whole force 32,500. 

" R. Patterson, 

*' Major-General, Commanding. 
"Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

"A. A. G. U. S. A., Washington, D. C." 

In this connection, and to show the disposition of 
" the Committee on the Conduct of the War" towards 
myself. I will mention an incident which occurred in 
regard to this despatch in the House of Representatives. 
General Scott himself acknowledges the receipt of it in 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 79 

his commentary on my testimony. That I had filed this 
despatch with the Conniiittee was well known by John 
Coyode of Pennsylvania, and D. W. Gooch of Massa- 
chusetts, for both spoke of it when I handed it in, and 
Mr. Covode observed that he knew the fact, as he had 
heard it from several persons ; and yet both afterwards 
denied the existence of it, as may be seen by reference 
to the Daily Globe of 15th February, 1862, during a de- 
bate in Congress, when Mr. Blair of Missouri was cen- 
suring the General-in-chief for forcing the Battle of Bull 
Run, without having my army to join General McDow- 
ell's after it was known that Johnston had come down. 
Mr. Blair said : 

" I wish to state that it was well known to the General 
commanding the United States army, that General John- 
ston with his forces had eluded Patterson and was present at 
that fight at the beginning of it. I want to state that it was 
well known by despatches from General Patterson himself, 
and that when this information came here, the President of 
the United States went to General Scott and protested against 
the army proceeding against Bull Run and Manassas, but 
General Scott insisted upon its being done. And that whole 
defeat of the American army there occurred with the full 
knowledge of this fact upon the part of the General in com- 
mand, and when they still insisted upon marching upon 
Manassas, they did it with the full knowledge that Beaure- 
gard had been reinforced by Johnston, and against the protest 
of the President of the United States. That, sir, is the fact in 
reference to this matter. It is a fact that I stated in the 
special session of Congress. It was not denied then, it can- 
not be denied now. 

" Mr. Covode. Do I understand the gentleman to say that 
General Patterson had telegraphed General Scott that John- 
ston had eluded him ? 



80 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN" 

" Mr. Blair of Missouri. Yes, sir, on Friday or Saturday 
preceding the Battle of Bull Run. 

" Mr. Covode. Well, Mr. Speaker, I cannot explain the 
matter, but I simply say to the gentleman from Missouri, 
that he is mistaken. 

" Mr. Blair of Missouri. And the gentleman from Missouri 
says he is not mistaken. He knows as much in reference to 
this matter as the gentleman upon the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, and has as high authority for what he 
states as the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

" Mr. Covode. I say that General Patterson never tele- 
graphed any such thing to General Scott 

" Mr. Gooch. Do I understand the gentleman from Mis- 
souri to say that General Scott had the information from 
General Patterson that General Johnston had eluded him ? 

" Mr. Blair. Yes, sir. General Patterson. 

" Mr. Gooch. I think the gentleman from Missouri is mis- 
taken, and I would like to know on what authority he makes 
the statement. 

" Mr. Blair. I know the fact. I desire to be as particular 
as positive. I know that the President and General Scott 
were advised of the fact by General Patterson himself. 

" Mr. Bingham. When ? 

" Mr. Blair. I have stated several times. It was on Fri- 
day or Saturday previous to the battle. The President went 
to General Scott. I do not know whether he protested or 
not, but he suggested the propriety of waiting until General 
Patterson could be here with his forces, inasmuch as John- 
ston had eluded him. General Scott disregarded the wish 
and advice of the President on the subject. The military 
commander at that time, sir, brought upon us the disaster 
which befell our arms at Bull Pun. 

" Mr. Gooch. I think it possible that the President of the 
United States might have been in possession of the infor- 
mation to which the gentleman from Missouri refers, but I 
think, I know that he did not receive the information from 
General Patterson in any way whatever. The fact may have 
been telegraphed to the papers in Philadelphia, and from 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 81 

there may have been telegraphed here, but I do not think that 
General Patterson ever sent it to him or to anybody else in Wash- 
ington. 

" Mr. Covode. ... In regard to the telegraphic de- 
spatch from General Patterson. I have been astonished that 
the gentleman from Missouri has persisted so long in argu- 
ment with gentlemen on this floor, who had their hands tied, 
and were not in a position to answer him, when it was boldly 
asserted by them that that despatch was never sent by Gene- 
ral Patterson." 

Here is a series of assertions and contradictions. Mr. 
Blair, an independent member, anxious to vindicate the 
truth of history, asserts facts to the best of his knowledge, 
and although not a member of the Committee, nor hav- 
ing seen the evidence or documents, yet, every word he 
utters is truth. 

Messrs. Covode and Gooch, partisan members of the 
Committee, with all the evidence and documents in their 
possession, positively assert that which was entirely false, 
in their extreme anxiety to make me the scapegoat. I 
had informed the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
Messrs. Covode and Gooch being members, and both 
present at the time (see Report, vol. ii, p. 97), that on 
the 20th July I telegraphed General Scott as follows : 

" With a portion of his force Johnston left Winchester by 
the road to Millwood on the afternoon of the 18th." 

It so chanced that one of my staff, Major Craig 
Biddle, was present in the House of Representatives at 
this debate. Major Biddle, knowing that I had so in- 
formed General Scott, and that the assertions of Covode 
and Gooch were untrue, telegraphed to me for a copy ol 

6 



82 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

my telegram to General Scott, which on receipt he placed 
in the hands of Mr. Blair, who again brought the subject 
before the House. 

I quote from the Congressional Globe : 

"Mr. Blair of Missouri. ... In July last, or Ist of Au- 
gust, when I first spoke upon the subject in this House, for 
the purpose of putting that responsibility where it belonged, I 
stated what I knew to be a fact, and reiterated that fact on 
Friday last, that the General in command of the army knew 
that General Johnston had eluded General Patterson, and 
left Winchester to reinforce General Beaureo-ard at Manas- 
sas. That is what I said, but it seemed that gentlemen upon 
the other side were so full of some secret they had got in 
committee, that they at once raised this side issue with me, 
as to whether General Patterson sent the despatch or not. 

" Mr. Gooch. If the gentleman will permit me to inter- 
rupt him, I desire to say that, so far as I am concerned, I 
desire to raise no side issue with him, so far as the main 
question is concerned, as to this information being received 
by the authorities here. I did, however, desire to correct 
the gentleman in reference to his statement that General 
Patterson furnished this information." 

(That is, Mr. Gooch was quite willing that Mr. Blair 
should say that the authorities were informed of the 
fact, but it would not answer their purpose to let it be 
known that General Patterson had given the informa- 
tion.) 

" Mr. Blair said: I believed at the time that this informa- 
tion came direct from General Patterson to the General in 
command here ; but that General Scott received the informa- 
tion there is no earthly doubt. N'or is there any doubt that 
the President suggested to General Scott the propriety of 
waiting for General Patterson's army, in order to support the 
column of General McDowell. I have no doubt of that fact, 
for I have knowledge of it. It is of no importance whether 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 83 

General Patterson sent the information or not, but it appears 
from the letter which I hold in my hand that I am correct, 
and that General Patterson did send a despatch to General 
Scott on the subject. I received the letter from a gentleman 
with whom I am very well acquainted, and I will read it for 
the information of the House : 

" Washington, February 16th, 1862. 

" My dear Colonel : 

" I inclose' a copy of a despatch which has been forwarded 
to me by General Patterson. It, as well as my own recol- 
lection, fully confirms the statement made by you in the 
House, that General Patterson on the 20th of July commu- 
nicated to the headquarters of the army at Washington the 
intelligence that Johnston had, with a portion of his force, 
left Winchester by the road to Millwood. This despatch 
was given in evidence before the Investigating Committee, 
as appears by its record. General Patterson's force at Mar- 
tinsburg was eighteen thousand two hundred men, 

" Very sincerely yours, 

" Craig Biddle." 
[Despatch.) 

" Headquarters Department of Pennsylvania, 
Charlestown, Virginia, July 20, 1861. 

" With a portion of his force, Johnston left Winchester 
by the road to Millwood on the afternoon of the 18th. His 
whole force thirty-five thousand two hundred. 

" R. Patterson, 

" Major-General, Commanding. 
"Colonel E. D. Townsend, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. Army, 

"Washington, D. C." 

This debate gives a fair sample of the " reliable in- 
formation" which members of this Committee were 
enabled, by their position, to foist upon the public, and 
which not every one is so lucky as to be able to prove 
utterly mendacious by their own record, before the very 
body that appointed them. 



84 NARRA.TIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

No one acquainted Avith the country needs to be told 
that my movement from Martinsburg to Charlestown was 
in no respect a retreat or withdrawal from the enemy. 

When I arrived at Charlestown, and was about to 
advance from that point, the difficulties which I anti- 
cipated from the expiration of the time of service of the 
regiments under my command culminated. I have 
shown that my requisition on the Governor of Pennsyl- 
vania for three years' troops in May had been counter- 
manded. I, therefore, having none but three months' 
troops under my command, in my communications to 
the General-in-chief never failed to urge the danger of 
acting just as their terms of service were expiring. On 
the 20th of June I had used to General Scott [Report on 
the Conduct of the War, vol. ii, p. 126) the following em- 
phatic, and, I may say, prophetic language : 

"I beg to remind the General-iu-chief that the period of 
service of nearly all the troops here will expire within a 
month, and that if we do not meet the enemy with them, we 
will be in no condition to do so for three months to come." 

Yet, with this fact perfectly well kno^vn, the attac]^ 
on Manassas was delayed until the 21st of July. On 
the 16th, I had said (p. 132) : 

" I have to report that the term of service of a very large 
portion of this force will expire in a few days. From an 
undercurrent expression of feeling, I am confident that many 
will be inclined to lay down their arms the day their time 
expires. With such a feeling existing, any active operations 
towards Winchester cannot be thought of, until they are 
replaced by three years' men." 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 85 

And on the ITtli, 18tli, and 19th, the same thing 
{Report, p, 92). 

What made the matter still worse, was an order, pub- 
lished at Washington, which had become known to the 
command, directing that all volunteers in service should 
be returned to their homes in time to be mustered out 
at the expiration of their term of service. This was in 
accordance with the law on the subject, but no reinforce- 
ments were sent me to replace the troops of which a 
literal compliance with this order would have entirely 
stripped me. 

My time after this was employed in sending off the 
troops under my command, until, on the 25th of July, 
I was relieved by General Banks. 

This is a plain unexaggerated statement of the whole 
of my operations. 

I think that I have shown : 

"1st. That I have always courted an investigation of any 
charge that could be made against me. 

" 2d. That my whole course was entirely approved by the 
officers attached to my column, whom I was instructed to 
consult. 

" 3d. That I complied with every order issued to me. 

" 4th. That I kept Johnston from joining Beauregard, not 
only on the day I was directed to do so, but for five days 
afterwards. 

" 5th. That I was never informed that the battle had not 
been fought at the time indicated, though within reach of a 
telegraph, but on the contrary, the only despatch received 
convinced me that the battle had been fought. 

" 6th. That for the delay in fighting it I was in nowise 
responsible. 



86 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

" 7th. That the General-in-cMef, when I told him I was 
not strong enough, in my opinion, to attack Johnston, could 
have ordered me to do so, if he differed from me, as I told 
him all the circumstances, and asked, ' Shall I attack?' 

" 8th. That I informed him that Johnston had gone to 
General Beauregard, and he himself, in his comments on 
my testimony (see page 241, vol. ii. Conduct of the War)^ 
admits that he knew it before delivering battle on the 21st 
of July." 

Of the testimony taken before the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, relative to the operations of my 
column, it is unnecessary for me to make a minute 
examination. The documentary evidence and the best 
informed witnesses sustain me in all that I have here 
presented. Some of the witnesses were honest, well- 
meaning gentlemen, but acquainted neither with my 
orders, my force, the amount of my transportation, nor 
anything which would enable them to form a fair judg- 
ment. Some were without any military knowledge or 
experience. To notice their strictures minutely would 
be tedious to the reader, and seems to be superfluoiis. 

These reflections do not apply to the remarks of Ge- 
neral Scott, which I desire to notice with all the consi- 
deration to which anything coming from him is entitled. 
His statement, sent to the Committee, is as follows : 

" New York, March 31, 1862. 

■ " On the statement of Major-General Patterson, submitted 
by him as evidence to the Honorable the Committee of the 
House of Representatives on the Conduct of the "War, I beg 
leave to remark : 

" 1. That his statement, one hundred and forty-eight long 
pages, closely and indistinctly written, has been before me 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 87 

about forty-eiglit hours, including a Sunday when I was too 
much indisposed to work or to go to church ; that I cannot 
write or read at night nor at any time, except by short 
efforts, and that I have been entirely without help. 

" 2. That, consequently, I have read but little of the state- 
ment and voluminous documents appended, and have but 
about two hours left for comments on that little. 

" 3. The documents (mainly correspondence between Ge- 
neral Patterson and myself) are badly copied, being hardly 
intelligible in some places from the omission and change of 
words. 

" 4, General Patterson was never ordered by me, as he 
seems to allege, to attack the enemy without a probability 
of success ; but on several occasions he wrote as if he were 
assured of victory. For example : June 12th, he says he is 
' resolved to conquer, and will risk nothing;' and July 4th, 
expecting supplies the next day, he adds, as soon as they 
' arrive I shall advance to Winchester, to drive the enemy 
from that place.' Accordingly he issued orders for that 
movement on the 8th, next called a council of war, and stood 
fast at Martinsburg. 

" 5. But although General Patterson was never specifically 
ordered to attack the enemy, he was certainly told, and ex- 
pected, even if with inferior numbers, to hold the rebel army 
in his front on the alert, and to prevent it from reinforcing 
Manassas Junction, by means of threatening manoeuvres 
and demonstrations, results often obtained in war with half 
numbers. 

" 6. After a time, General Patterson moved upon Bunker 
Hill, and then fell off upon Charlestown, whence he seems 
to have made no other demonstration that did not look like a 
retreat out of Virginia. From that movement Johnston was 
at liberty to join Beauregard with any part of the army of 
Winchester. 

" 7. General Patterson alludes, with feeling, to my recall 
from him, back to Washington, after the enemy had evacu- 
ated Harper's Ferry, of certain troops sent to enable him to 
take that place, but the recall was necessary to prevent the 



88 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

(J-overnment and capital from falling into the enemy's hands. 
His inactivity, however, from that cause need not have been 
more than temporary, for he was soon reinforced up to, at 
least, the enemy's maximum number in the Winchester 
valley, without leading to a battle, or even a reconnoissance 
in force. 

" 8. He also often called for batteries and rifled cannon 
beyond our capacity to supply at the moment, and so in 
respect to regular troops, one or more regiments. He might 
as well have asked for a brigade of elephants. Till some 
time afterwards, we had for the defence of the Government 
and its capital but a few companies of regular foot and 
horse, and not half the number of troops, including all de- 
scriptions, if the enemy had chosen to attack us. 

" 9. As connected with this subject, I hope I may be per- 
mitted to notice the charge made against me on the iloor of 
Congress, that I did not stop Brigadier-General McDowell's 
movement upon Manassas Junction, after I had been in- 
formed of the reinforcement sent thither from Winchester, 
though urged to do so by one or more members of the 
Cabinet. 

" Now, it was, at the reception of that news, too late to 
call off the troops from the attack, and, besides, though 
opposed to the movement at first, we had all become ani- 
mated and sanguine of success ; and it is not true that I was 
urged by anybody in authority to stop the attack, which was 
commenced as early, I think, as the 18th of July. 

" 10. I have but time to say that, among the disadvantages 
under which I have been writing are these : I have not had 
within reach one of my own papers, and not an officer who 
was with me at the period in question. 

" Respectfully submitted to the Committee. 

" WiNFiELD Scott. 

"New York, March 31, 1862." 

General Scott's infirmities, thus detailed by himself, 
entitle him to the most sincere sympathy. His admis- 
sion that he has been able to read but little of the 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 89 

"documents (mainly correspondence between General 
Patterson and myself)," while it detracts very much 
from his comments upon them, is certainly creditable to 
his frankness. If too numerous to read, they must surely 
be too numerous to remember, especially by one who, 
at the time they were written or received, was occupied 
in the direction of other important military operations. 

The General admits that I was " never ordered to 
attack without a probability of success." 

In fact I was never ordered to attach at all, and as I 
did not see a probability of success, nor did any of the 
officers he had attached to my command and instructed 
me to consult, I claim that I was right not to attack the 
enemy's intrenched position at Winchester. 

Every despatch I ever received impressed upon me, 
not the necessity of striking a blow, or making a bold 
dash upon the enemy, but the exercise of the greatest 
caution ; to risk nothing, and never to give battle with- 
out a well-ascertained superiority. All felt that the 
first blow should be a decisive one, and that any success 
by the rebels would prove, as it did, an encouragement 
to years of resistance. After actually issuing the order 
for an attack on Winchester, I yielded reluctantly to 
the belief of my inability to do what I hoped, on the 
clearest evidence, and upon the judgment of those en- 
titled to be consulted. 

I did, with greatly inferior numbers, "hold the rebel 
army in my front on the alert," and I did prevent it 
from reinforcing Manassas Junction, by means of threat- 
ening manoeuvres and demonstrations " as ordered by 



90 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN" 

my military superior," not only on the day General 
Scott desired me to do so, but for five days afterwards. 
That no advantage was taken of this was not my fault. 
That the General-in-chief should cast any reflection upon 
the movement to Charlestown, is certainly singular, as 
he had himself ordered me to go there [ante, p. 68), 
and I had told him the precise day I was going and the 
route, via Bunker Hill, which I should take {ante, p. 70) . 
After my arrival in Charlestown the expiration of the 
term of service of most of my troops prevented any 
further demonstration. The fact that they would not 
in any number remain beyond their term of service at 
my request, created remark at the time, but as every 
commander who has since tried the experiment, has met 
with similar experience, I do not deem it necessary to 
give any of the details of my efforts to detain them. 

I regretted the recall of certain troops, just as I was 
partially across the Potomac, as it left me entirely with- 
out artillery. If it was necessary to paralyze my force 
to save Washington, I have no complaint to make. But 
after it was done, I do object to being blamed for the 
temporary delay occasioned by it. 

I did subsequently move, two days after receiving a 
single battery of six guns, and crossed the Potomac with 
less than 11,000 men, in the face of a force proved by 
the official report of General Johnston to be greatly my 
superior, and having, according to my information, 24 
pieces of artillery. 

Whether batteries and cannon could or could not be 
supplied me, I shall not discuss. As my adversary had. 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 91 

as he admits, at least 16 pieces of field artillery, together 
with heavy siege guns, I think no one will blame me 
for my attempts, ineffectual though they were, to obtain 
some additions to my six. My siege train when near 
Winchester consisted of one 30-pounder, one 24-pounder, 
and an old eight-inch howitzer. 

General Scott scorns to avail himself of the misstate- 
ments of the Committee, but frankly admits that he 
received the intelligence of Johnston's approach, but 
determined to fight the battle of Bull Run in spite of 
it. How absurd is it then to attribute the disaster of 
that day to the unexpected arrival of Johnston. It was 
known, but evidently deemed of small moment ; so great 
was the confidence at Washington, that they would not 
wait until I could come up. They deemed, and public 
opinion supported them in it, that their force was per- 
fectly irresistible against everything that the rebels could 
oppose to it. To use General Scott's own words : 

" Though opposed to the movement at first, we had 
all become animated and sanguine of success." 

I did not write to General Scott " as if assured of 
victory," though repeatedly declaring my readiness to 
assault Winchester if ordered by him to do so. I said 
nothing in my reports to foster the too sanguine ex- 
pectation of success which precipitated the attack of 
McDowell, while from my position it was impossible for 
me to co-operate with him. That my estimate of the 
difficulties of an advance in the Shenandoah Valley, 
with the three months' volunteers, was not exaggerated, 
sufficiently appears from the ill success that has since 



92 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

attended the movements, in that direction, of more ex- 
perienced troops, successively commanded by Generals 
Stone, Fremont, Banks, Miles, Milroy, Sigel, Wallace, 
and Hunter. The first successful campaign there since 
I relinquished the command was made very recently, by 
General Sheridan, at the head of a veteran army, after 
first meeting serious reverses. 

General Scott, in his recent Autobiography, has added 
nothing to his criticisms on this campaign, further than 
to say, in speaking of the attack on Vera Cruz : 

" Several Generals and Colonels, among them Major-Gene- 
ral Patterson, an excellent second in command, notwith- 
standing his failure as chief on the Slienau'doah in 1861, 
solicited the privilege of leading storming parties." 

While I am duly grateful for this compliment to my 
services in Mexico, I must protest against the assertion 
that I acted "as Chief on the Shenandoah in 1861." I 
was a subordinate, without knowing the plan of my prin- 
cipal. I was ordered to co-operate in a movement which 
was not — and I was not informed of its postponement — 
made at the time indicated. When I was in a condition 
to move into Virginia, and had actually crossed the Po- 
tomac, I was ordered back, and told " to keep within my 
limits, until I could satisfy the General-in-chief I ought 
to go beyond them." When I presented my plan to go 
to Leesburg, it was disapproved. When I asked for in- 
structions, they were not given. My movements were 
regulated by telegraphic despatches, received from day 
to day and hour to hour, and I never was invested with 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 93 

the dignity of "Chief," until it became expedient to 
make me responsible for the failure of the campaign. 

It will appear by an examination of the testimony be- 
fore the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that the 
arrival of General Johnston at Manassas was one of the 
very least of the causes of General McDowell's defeat. 

In answer to questions "put by the Committee, the 
following evidence was given. 

General J. B. Richardson : 

" I moved back to see what had become of the New York 
12th, on the left. It had probably taken as much as twenty 
minutes to go. through with this formation. I found, on 
arriving at the left, parts of two companies of the New York 
12th, about sixty men altogether, retreating outside of the 
woods, carrying along a few wounded. I asked what the 
matter was. and where they were going. They said the 
regiment was all killed, and they were falling back; the 
regiment had fallen back, those that were not killed. Says 
I, 'What are you running for? there is no enemy here. I 
cannot see anybody at all. Where is your Colonel V They 
knew nothing about it. The men knew nothing about any 
of their officers. I could not find any officers with the men 
at all, I believe. 

" Question. Why was it concluded to fight that battle on 
Sunday, without any knowledge of where Patterson and 
his men were, and of the position of Johnston ? Did you 
know at the time where they were ? I will ask that first, 

"Answer. Yes, sir. I knew General Johnston was on 
our right before we moved from there at all." 

General Richardson further says that if he had cap- 
tured certain batteries on Thursday night, which he 
could have done, there would have been no serious fight; 



94 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

that reinforcements from Richmond under General 
Davis, and from Winchester under General Johnston, 
came during Friday and Saturday nights, and he gives 
very clear reasons for the defeat at Bull Run. He 
says : 

" There is another thing I would like to say. From what 
we have learned since, the enemy handled every reserve 
they had, whereas our reserves loere not handled at all. The 
three brigades of reserves, Blenker's, Davis's, and mine, 
that were on the field that day, and Run^-on's reserve, which 
was at Fairfax Station, six miles ofi", I believe, and not han- 
dled at all, make 24,000 who were useless, whereas the enemy 
handled all their reserves. This is nothing new. I said the 
same that night." 

General Richardson adds : 

" We marched 50,000 men and 49 pieces of artillery, of 
which we saved 35 pieces." 

Major-General Heintzelman attributes the loss of the 
battle to the delay in bringing it on, and to improper 
disposition of the troops. Tyler's division, having but 
the shortest distance to go, was ordered to move first. 
Hunter's, which had the longest distance to go, followed 
Tyler's ; and Heintzelman says : 

" I think if we had reversed it, let Hunter go first, then 
let me follow him, and then Tyler follow me, that delay at 
Centreville would not have occurred. 

" Question to General Heintzelman. What in your opinion 
really led to the disaster of that day ? 

" Answer. It is hard to tell. There were a number of 
causes. In the first place, the delay of Friday and Saturday 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 95 

at Centreville was an efficient cause. Another cause was 
the three hours lost at Centreville on Sunday morning." 



Major-General Franklin : 

" Question by the Chairman. I have always wondered 
that the battle was fought then, when it was, after it was 
understood in the army that Johnston had come down, con- 
trary to the expectation which was entertained, that Patter- 
son would hold him in check. 

" Answer. I will tell you what suggested itself to me, 
when I got to Bull Run, and that is : we ought to have en- 
camped at the fine hills there, and waited there overnight, 
and got up early in the morning, when we could have whip- 
ped them. 

" Question by the Chairman. It has always seemed to me 
that, when you knew that Johnston had come down, you 
should have got twenty-five thousand men from here, and 
as many more, perhaps, from Fortress Monroe, and then you 
would have had the thing sure. I always wondered wh}^ 
that was not done when Patterson had not held Johnston in 
check, as it was understood he would do. 

"The witness. Patterson's officers give a very good ac- 
count of him. He knew nothing about what the army was 
to do. He supposed the battle had come off on Tuesday, 
and knew nothing about what was really doing. 

" The Chairman. It strikes me that it was a great fault 
that so important a circumstance was not understood before 
the battle was begun. 

" The witness. I think that if we had stopped at Sudley's 
stream they would have fought us in the morning, but we 
would have fought them on our own ground, and would 
have whipped them. 

" The Chairman. They would then have lost the benefit 
of all their batteries. I have always wondered at you going 
into that fight there, when you should really have got rein- 
forcements of twenty to thirty thousand more men. 

" The witness. I think it would have been an advisable 



96 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

plan to have stopped there at Bull Run. We would probably 
have had to fight about the same time, but then we should 
have fought on our own ground, and should have had a 
better position than they could have got. We could have 
got a beautiful position." 



From the testimony of General Wadsworth : 

" Question. What is your opinion as to the result of that 
battle, had the provisions and transportation been brought 
up on Thursday, and the battle fought on Friday morning, 
instead of Sunday ? 

" Answer. We would have walked over the field. John- 
ston is regarded by our officers as much superior to Beau- 
regard; as much the ablest officer in this army. All the 
reports show that he had a great deal to do with the dispo- 
sition of the enemy on that day." 



General Henry W. Slocum : 

" Question by Mr. Odell. You were in Hunter's division 
and rested at Centreville, did you not ? 

" Answer. Yes, sir. 

" Question. Do you remember why it was you rested there 
an hour or an hour and a half on Sunday morning ? 

" Answer. I never understood that. I understood that 
there was some confusion among the troops ahead of us ; 
somebody in the way, I understood. It was a very unfor- 
tunate resting spell. 

" Question by Mr. Chandler. But for that you would 
have won the day ? 

"Answer. Yes, sir, I think so." 

General William F. Barry : 

" Question. Can you state to us what led to the rout of 
our army on the field that day ? 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 97 

" Answer. I think the principal cause was the uninstructed 
state of our troops. The troops were raw, many of the 
officers were indolent, and they did not behave themselves 
as they should have done on that day." 

Further on, General Barry says : 

" It was impossible to rally the Eleventh regiment, the 
Fire Zouaves. I rode in among them, and implored them 
to stand. I told them the guns would never be captured if 
they would only stand, but they seemed paralyzed ; standing 
with their eyes and mouths wide open, and did not seem to 
Kear me. I then reminded them of all the oaths they had 
sworn at Alexandria, after the death of Ellsworth, and that 
that was the best chance they would ever have for vengeance, 
but they paid no attention to what I said at all. 

" Question. So far as the whole fight was concerned, the 
enemy had infinitely the advantage of our troops in jDOsition ? 

" Answer. Yes, sir, the ground was of their own selecting. 
I think if the battle had been fought at the hour it was 
expected to be fought, at 8| or 8J o'clock in the morning, 
we would have won it. There was a loss of three hours 
then, which I think had a very important efl:ect on the suc- 
cess of the day. It enabled their fresh troops to get up ; 
it prevented our turning their flank so completely as we 
would have done by surprise, for when our column halted 
the enemy discovered the direction we were going to take, 
and prepared for it ; and, worse than that, the halting, the 
standing still, fatigued the men as much, if not more, than 
by marching that time. 

" Question. So that our men were really very much ex- 
hausted when they went into the field ? 

" Answer. Yes, sir. 

" Question. But if the battle had been fought three or 
four hours earlier, then Johnston's reserves would not have 
been up in time ? 

" Answer. I think the fate of that day would have been 
decided before they got upon the ground. I look upon that 
delay as the most unfortunate thing that happened. The 

7 



98 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

troops that ought to have been out of the way were in the 
way before we could get to the turning-off point of the road." 

General E. D. Keyes : 

" Question by the Chairman. To what do you attribute 
the disaster of the day ? 

" Answer. To the want often thousand more troops. That 
is, I think if we had ten thousand more troops than we had 
to go into action, say at eleven o'clock in the morning, we 
should certainly have beaten them. I followed along down 
the stream, and Sherman's battery diverged from me, so 
that it left a wide gap between us, and ten thousand men 
could have come in between me and Sherman, which was 
the weak point in our line, &c. 

" Question by the Chairman. Had it been known that 
Patterson had not detained Johnston, would it not have been 
imprudent to hazard a battle then anyhow ? 

"Answer. If it had been known that the thirty to forty 
thousand men that Johnston was said to have had, would 
have been upon us, it would have been impolitic to have 
made the attack on Sunday. 

" Question by the Chairman. Even after the disaster, what 
prevented your making a stand at Centreville, and sending 
for reinforcements and renewing the fight there ? 

" Answer. I was not the Commander-in-chief. 

" Question by the Chairman. Was there not a strong bri- 
gade on Centreville Heights that had not been in the en- 
gagement at all that day ? 

"Answer. There was a division there, — three brigades." 

General John G. Barnard, chief engineer to General 
McDowell : 

" Question by Chairman. Without going minutely into 
the matter, will you state concisely to what you attribute the 
disaster to our army in that battle ? 

" Answer. One of the influential causes was, I think, the 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 99 

loss of time in getting underway the morning of the fight. 
The fact the repulse turned into a disastrous defeat, I at- 
tribute to the fact that our troops were all raw. General 
McDowell had not even time to see all his troops. They 
were brigaded only for the march, and put under officers 
whom the troops had not time to know, and who had no 
time to know the troops, &c. 

" Question by the Chairman. You attribute the first bad 
phase of that battle to the fact that our troops did not get 
on the ground in time ? 

" Answer. Yes, sir. I think one hour's difference would 
have gained the battle. We had almost gained it as it was. 

" Question. "What caused that delay ? 

" Answer. There were two causes, distinct from each 
other. One was, that in the plan of the attack, General 
Tyler's division was to move first, &c. The second was, 
the much longer time it took for the column of Hunter to get 
around Sudley's Ford than we calculated for," &c. 

Captain (now General) Charles Griffin : 

In answer to the question of the Chairman, " Will 
you please inform us what, according to your best judg- 
ment, led to the disaster of that day ?" replies at length, 
and gives as reason, that his battery, also the battery 
of Captain Ricketts, were put entirely too far in advance, 
in a wrong position and without an adequate support, 
with only the New York Fire Zouaves; that he took 
the position he was ordered to, against his judgment, 
saying, the Zouaves would not support him ; saying, " I 
will go, but mark my words, they will not support us," 
and that when the firing began, the supports " broke 
and run," and the batteries were lost. 

" Question by the Chairman. You say if your battery and 



100 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

Ricketts' had been properly supported, it could not have been 
taken ? 

"Answer. If those eleven guns had been properly sup- 
ported, I think the day would have been different, and 1 
think that if we had not been moved on that point, and the 
Captains of the batteries had been allowed to exercise their 
own judgment, the day would have resulted differently. 

" Question. "Was it not necessary, in your advanced posi- 
tion, that you should have had the largest requisite number 
to support you ? 

" Answer. Yes, sir. In the first place, a battery should 
never have been sent forward to reconnoitre. That is a 
military mistake; of course I am only a Captain, and a great 
many would censure me for saying this, but it is so. It was 
the duty of the infantry to have gone forward and found out 
what the enemy were doing, and not to have sent the bat- 
tery forward to find that out." 



Further on he says (p. 174) : 

" My last words were, ' These Fire Zouaves will never 
support me.' 

" Question. Why did you think that ? 

" Answer. I had seen them on the field in a state of dis- 
organization, and I did not think they had the moral courage 
to fight. I do not think that any troops that will go through 
the country in a disorganized state, thieving and robbing, 
are brave men. I had no support all day long, with the 
exception that the New York 14th came to me when I was 
in my second or third position. An-officer said, 'I have been 
ordered here to support you ; where shall I go ?' He went 
to a fence in rear of the batteries. I said, ' Don't go in 
rear of us, for you will stand a chance of being hit. If their 
batteries fire at me and don't hit me, it will pass over me 
and hit you.' They then went to one side, and when I saw 
them again they were falling back, every man for himself, 
about five hundred yards from me. That was the last I saw 
of that regiment that day. 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 101 

" Question. You consider one of the errors, the serious 
error of the day, was the fact that the artillery was not pro- 
perly supported by the infantry ? 

" Answer. Undoubtedly. I consider that the first great 
error that was committed that day was the sending these 
batteries forward without support. 

" Question. These two errors you think led to the first and 
most important repulse of the day ? 

" Answer. I think these two errors led to the first and 
the repulse of the day." 

Colonel Thomas A. Davies : 

" Question. Wliat led to the final defeat, as near as you 
could ascertain on the ground ? 

" Answer. I can tell you what I think is the cause of the 
whole defeat of that day. The troops were raw ; the men 
had been accustomed to look to their Colonels as the only 
men to give them commands. They had never been taught 
the succession of ofiicers, &c., &c. The ofiicers did not them- 
selves know what to do. They were themselves raw and 
green, &c., &c. That I think was the cause of manj- of the 
regiments returning from the field, not from any cowardice 
or fear of fighting, but because, having lost their Colonels, 
they supposed they were out of the battle. I consider that 
the great cause of our army being put in rout on the right 
wing. 

" Question. What would have been the effect had you 
waited there at Centreville Heights, and rested your men a 
day or two, seeing that Johnston was down there, until Pat- 
terson's army had followed him there, and been ordered to 
turn their left ? 

'' Answer. We should, undoubtedly, have won the. battle. 

" Question. Would you have had any difficulty in rallying 
your whole forces and holding your position on Centreville 
Heights, while you sent for Patterson, or for reinforcements 
from here and Fortress Monroe? Would you not have 
worsted the enemy in that way ? 



102 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

" AnsweT. We never should have been compelled to leave 
the place, with what troops I had under my command. I 
could have held my position there with the troops I had, 
which were, my brigade, Richardsou's brigade, Blenker's 
bri2:ade, and some batteries. 

" Question. Was it not a terrible military blunder to come 
back to Washington in disorder ? 

" Answer. That is putting it rather strong. I should not 
like to say it was a military blunder. 

" Question. Well, it was a mistake then? 

" Answer. I think this : that we could have held our 
position there. There is no doubt about that. 

" Question. Then you ought to have held it, ought you 
not ? 

" Answer. That is a matter I am not responsible for, &c. 

" Question. Would it not have been easier to have de- 
fended Washington on Centreville Heights than to have 
come pellmell here to do it ? 

" Answer. I can answer that very readily. I think it 
would. There is no doubt about that." 

General Daniel Tyler : 

" Question by Chairman. Please give a brief and concise 
statement of what you saw there, and how the battle was 
conducted, &c., &c. Do this without questioning at first. 
I want to get particularly what, in your judgment, caused 
the disaster on that day. 

" Answer. The first great trouble was the want of disci- 
pline and instruction in the troops. The troops needed that 
regimental and brigade instruction which would have en- 
abled them to act together in masses to advantage. 

" Question. Were there any more proximate causes than 
that ? 

" Answer. There was a great want of instruction and pro- 
fessional knowledge among the ofiScers, — the company and 
regimental ofi&cers. 

" Question. Why did you move first, as you were to move 
the shortest distance on the road ? 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 103 

" Answer. That was the order of march by General Mc- 
Dowell." 

General Andrew Porter was asked the following 
leading question : 

" Had Patterson detained Johnston in the valley of "Win- 
chester, so that no reinforcements would have been brought 
down by Johnston to Beauregard, what, in your opinion, 
would have been the result of that battle ? 

" Answer. Well, it might have ended one way or the 
other. Our troops could not stand the attacking of the 
enemy ; they were played out quite early. The men were 
exhausted ; somehow or other, they seemed to have no heart 
in the matter. The officers were more to blame than the 
men," &c., &c. 

General AVilliam W. Averill : 

" Question. "What, in your judgment, caused the disaster 
of that day ? 

" Answer. They commenced, I presume, almost from the 
time we started from Arlington, from the other side of the 
river. There were a great many causes that combined to 
lose the day" to us. The most apparent cause, however, at 
the time we first felt we were beaten, that we had to^ retire, 
and that we had felt for some time beforehand, was the 
want of concentration of the troops; the feeling that we 
ought to have had more men in action at one time. 

" Question. The want of concentration in the field ? 

" Answer. Yes, sir. We crossed the Run with eighteen 
thousand men. I do not believe there were over six or eight 
thousand actually engaged at any one time. 

" Question. Was not the nature of the battle-field such, 
that it was exceedingly difficult to bring a large body of 
men into action at any one time ? 

" Answer. I think it was about as fine a battle-field as 



104 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

you could find between here and Richmond. I have no 
idea there was any better. 

" Question, Was the field favorable for the movements 
and manoeuvring of large bodies of men ? 

" Answer. One or two divisions of the size we had there 
could have manoeuvred very well." 

Further on, General Averill says (p. 214) : 

" There was the want of a headquarters somewhere on the 
field. All the staff oflicers who knew anything about the 
position of the enemy, had to act without orders." 

General Ricketts : 

" Question. "Was it good generalship to order you to ad- 
vance with your battery without more support than you had ? 

" Answer, Do you mean the one regiment ? 

" Question. Yes, sir, the Fire Zouaves you speak of. 

" Answer. No, sir, I do not think it was, &c., &c. 

" Question. Suppose that battle could have been fought 
two weeks before it was fought, what would have been the 
result ? 

" Answer. I believe if we had fought it even two days 
before, we would have walked over the field. 

" Question. As a military man, to what circumstances do 
you attribute our disaster on that day ? 

" Answer. I impute it to the want of proper ofiicers 
among the volunteers. 

" Question. Do you mean the Colonels and Generals ? 

" Answer. I mean throughout. I cannot say particular 
Colonels and particular Captains, because many of them 
were excellent. But, as a general rule, many of the officers 
were inferior to the men themselves," &c. 

These extracts from the testimony of fourteen general 
officers, out of eighteen examined, nearly all of them 
experienced and distinguished in the service, show that 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 105 

there was no difficulty whatever in ascertaining the true 
cause of defeat at Bull Run. Each gave his opinion as 
to what caused the defeat on that day, all going to show 
conclusively that the defeat was attributable to the fol- 
lowing causes : 

1st. The failure of General McDowell to attack Ma- 
nassas, as he could have done, before the 21st of July, 
prior to the arrival of the enemy's- reinforcements, in- 
stead of on that day, after they had arrived. 

2d. The delay of the whole army for several hours 
on the 21st of July. 

3d. The throwing of two of our batteries to the front, 
beyond support, thus causing their capture. 

4th. The failure to have within supporting distance, 
and to bring into action at the critical moment, the 
ample reserves of that army, which were more than 
double the number of my entire command. 

5th. The want of discipline in the troops. 

In the face of this testimony, the Committee assert in 
their report : 

" That the principal cause of the defeat on that day was, 
the failure of General Patterson to hold the forces of John- 
ston in the Valley of the Shenandoah." 

Had the arrival of Johnston, five days after the time 
I was directed to hold him, had the effect attributed to 
it, common fairness should have induced the Committee 
to say, not that it was my failure to hold Johnston, but 
that it was the delay in fighting the battle of Bull Run 
that was the principal cause of the defeat of General 
McDowell. 



106 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

I have thus thrown togethelr, as concisely as I could, 
the facts bearing on my case. It has been necessary to 
refer to many documents and papers, the perusal of 
which will be tedious, and even when read, not so satis- 
factory to the unmilitary reader as the opinion upon 
them by competent and intelligent officers. The pre- 
sent Major-General George H. Thomas, whose reputa- 
tion as a soldier and a man is second to none, and who 
served under me during my whole campaign^ in a letter 
received a few months ago, after an experience of three 
years of most arduous service, thus writes : 

" Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Before Atlanta, Ga., Aug. 8tli, 1864. 

" My dear General : 

" Your favor of the 16th July, was only received a few 
days since, owing doubtless to the irregularities of the mails 
to the front. In the council of war at Martinsburg, I in sub- 
stance advised an advance towards Winchester, at least as 
far as Bunker Hill, and if your information, after the army 
reached Bunker Hill, led you to believe that Johnston still 
occupied Winchester in force, then to shift our troops over 
to Charlestown, as that move would place our communica- 
tions with our depot of supplies in safety, and still threaten 
and hold Johnston at Winchester, which I understand was 
all that you were expected or required to do. I should have 
advised a direct advance on Winchester, but for the charac- 
ter of the troops composing your army. They were all, with 
the exception of a couple of squadrons of the Second IJ. S. 
Cavalry and two batteries of regular artillery, three months' 
men, and their term of service would expire in a few days. 
Judging of them as of other volunteer troops, had I been 
their commander, I should not have been willing to risk 
them in a heavy battle, coming off within a few days of the 
expiration of their service. 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 107 

" I have always believed, and have frequently so expressed 
myself, that your management of the three months' cam- 
paign was able and judicious, and was to the best interests 
of the service, considering the means at your disposal, and 
the nature of the troops under your command, 

" With much respect and esteem, I remain. General, 
" Very sincerely and truly yours, 

" George H. Thomas, 

" Major-General U. S. V. 
"Major-General Egbert Patterson, 

"Philadelphia, Pa." 



I also take great pride in presenting other testimonials, 
from officers who were familiar with the events as they 
occurred : 

Letter from Major-General W. H. Keim : 

"Surveyor-General's Office, State of Pennsylvania, 
Harrisburg, Pa., Nov. 22d, 1861. 

" My dear General : 

" I read your vindication of the campaign in Virginia, de- 
livered at the First Troop festival, and believe it places 
your action in the proper light, and enlightens the public 
upon a subject which is little known to the people. I know 
that you had the advice and support of the regular army 
officers, as well as those of the volunteer service. The diffi- 
culties under which we labored, of men called out for three 
months, a serious evil; the short supplies of transportation, 
and the difficulty to keep up the subsistence, are not known 
to the army at this matured state of affairs, and can hardly 
be fully appreciated by any persons not connected with mili- 
tary movements on a large scale. I had the pleasure of an 
interview with the President a few weeks since, when, in 
speaking of my connection with your column, I took occa- 
sion to speak freely of the injustice done to you and your 



108 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

command, enumerated the trials and obstacles thrown in our 
way, and the folly of attacking an intrenched force with 
equal or inferior forces. I have no doubt time will vindi- 
cate and do j ustice to all. 

"Yours, very truly, 

" W. H. Keim. 

" Major-General Patterson." 



Letter from Colonel Richard A. Oakford 



" ScRANTON, December 4tli, 1861. 

" Majoe-General R. Patterson. 

" Dear Sir : By reason of a lame hand, I have been unable 
for some time past to use my pen ; with the returning use of 
my hand, I cannot resist the desire to express my gratifica- 
tion that you have (at the supper of the First City Troop), 
seen a suitable time to defend yourself in part, against the 
false and unjust charges made against your strategy in Vir- 
ginia. 

" Living as I do in a part of Pennsylvania which is from 
circumstances closely connected with ISTew York, and draw- 
ing most of its newspaper opinions from that city, I have 
found it difficult to disabuse the minds of my neighbors, of 
the false opinions they had received through the ISTew York 
press. 

"Your speech has had a good effect. I hope you will, 
when a fitting time arrives, publish all the orders, &c., con- 
nected with the movements of your corps d'armee, feel- 
ing well assured that when the public are aware of all the 
facts, that you will not only be exculpated from all censure, 
but that all your moves will be not only approved, but ap- 
plauded. 

" With best wishes, yours truly, 

" Richard A. Oakford, 

" Late Colonel, Commanding 15tli Keg't P. V." 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 109 

From Major-General James S. Negley. 

" Headquarters Negley's Brigade, 

Camp Nevin, November 24tli, 1861. 

"Major-General Robert Patterson, 

" Philadelphia. 

" Dear General : I read your speech at the Continental 
with much pleasure. "While I deeply regretted the necessity 
of an old officer and well-tried friend of the Union having to 
vindicate his honor and patriotism at a festive board, I hope 
your words have reached the ears of an impartial public, 
who will now be willing to do you justice. I think there is 
no longer a necessity to blame the weak to shelter the strong. 

" My staff join me in offering you their congratulations, 
and sincere wishes for your good health and continued pros- 
perity, and assure you that you still have our friendship as 
warmly as when on the banks of the Potomac, and only re- 
gret that you are not with us. 

" I have the honor to remain yours, very truly, 

" James S. Negley." , 

Also a letter from Colonel (now General) George H. 
Gordon, formerly of the Regular army : 

" Headquarters Second Massachusetts Kegiment, 
Frederick, Md., December 22d, 1861. 

" General Robert Patterson, 

"Philadelphia. 

" My dear Sir : Your letter of the 20th inst. reached me 
yesterday. It is with pleasure I reply. You are aware there 
are many facts known to me only as common rumor, in 
relation to your movement from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill, 
thence to Harper's Ferry, Virginia, such as the actual infor- 
mation you received as to when General McDowell was to 
give battle, and from whom you received it, also as to the 
number of the rebels at Winchester, their armament, defen- 
sive works, &c. Of these subjects, so vital in forming an exact 
conclusion, I have, as said before, no information but general 



110 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

rumor. I believe the rebels have never given us either their 
number at Winchester, the number or cahbre of tlieir artil- 
lery, or the nature and extent of their fortifications ; if they 
have, I think you can accept their statements as conclusive. 
If it agrees with or is larger than your estimate at Bunker 
Hill, to have attacked Winchester with the force and arma- 
ment you had would, in my judgment, have been bad general- 
ship, would have been followed by certain defeat, with 
terrible loss of life. I again have to regret that the few days 
intervening between my arrival at Martinsburg, Virginia, 
where I joined your column, and the day you marched to- 
wards Winchester, did not give me an opportunity of better 
informing myself of the number and nature of the troops 
under your command. I joined you on Thursday, the 
11th day of July, 1861, and marched as one regiment of 
your column on the Monday following, the 15th. From 
my own observation, and from what was told me by officers 
generally, I believed your force to consist almost entirely of 
those whose time, in a large majority of the regiments, was 
about expiring. I also believed, fi-om what I heard, that 
my own was the only three years' regiment under your 
command. Much of your force, indeed I can except few 
regiments, I found more in rags than uniforms; and quite 
indifterent to discipline ; some regiments appeared more 
like mobs than soldiers. As to the numbers of your column, 
I had been led to believe that it varied from thirty to forty 
thousand, but was astonished to learn from your Adjutant- 
General, now General Porter, commanding a division in the 
Army of the Potomac, that you had less than twenty thou- 
sand men under your command. When we left Martins- 
burg en route to Winchester, it was the prevailing opinion 
among all officers of rank that you had been informed Mc- 
Dowell would engage the rebels near Manassas on the 15th 
or 16th of July at farthest. For one, I placed implicit 
confidence in the report. 

" On Monday night your whole column reached Bunker 
Hill, my regiment encamping on ground vacated that after- 
noon by the rebels, their fires still smoking, and evidences 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. Ill 

of their hasty retreat apparent. We were but a few miles 
from Winchester ; the road thence was obstructed by logs ; 
rebel pickets thrown out almost within sight and sound of 
our own. Here we remained until Wednesday morning, 
the 17th of July. 

" At this time, from general rumor and from information 
received, I had no doubt of three facts: first, that a battle 
near Manassas had been fought by McDowell ; second, that 
we had held the rebel leader at Winchester, Jo. Johnston, 
in check, and thus prevented his uniting his forces to those 
under the rebel Beauregard ; third, that the rebels at Win- 
chester numbered between thirty and forty thousand, sup- 
ported by thirty or forty pieces of heavy siege artillery, and 
well posted behind strong fortifications. Then there seemed 
nothing more for your column to do but to establish itself 
on a different base-line than that from Williamsport to Mar- 
tinsburg. A road over which supplies must be hauled by 
wagons from Hagerstown, Maryland, to Martinsburg, Vir- 
ginia, thence by some mode of conveyance to any other 
portion of Virginia southward, is certainly not preferable to 
one which conveys all the way by rail, both in the loyal and 
rebel portion of the country. If we could establish ourselves 
at Harper's Ferry, to operate in the Shenandoah Valley and 
southward, between the Blue Ridge and the Potomac, there 
can be but one opinion of its military propriety, when it is 
known that the rebels had evacuated all the region north of 
Winchester, and that opinion must be favorable to you. 

" You thus, on Wednesday, the 18th of July, moved 
your column, of less than twenty thousand, with all its en- 
cumbering wagon train, by flank, around Winchester, reach- 
ing Charlestown, Virginia, on the line of rail from Harper's 
Ferry to Winchester, Virginia, late in the afternoon of the 
same day. None doubted that we were risking much in 
making the detour. 

" An exasperated force of rebels, largely outnumbering 
our own, with metal heavier and more numerous, would not, 
we supposed, permit us to get between them and the sources 
of our supplies, would not permit us to hold the key to the 



112 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN" 

Shenandoah Valley and the Valley of the Potomac, without 
at least fighting a severe battle, and seeking compensation 
for the loss, which we supposed we had occasioned them by 
preventing a junction with the rebels opposite Washington. 
But the movement was made, and made with signal ability, 
each brigade ready at a moment's notice to throw itself into 
line of battle, to protect its train, and to manoeuvre, as occa- 
sion might require. I felt, sir, on Wednesday night, that you 
had outwitted the rebel Johnston. On Thureday morning, 
the 18th of July, you discovered the expected battle opposite 
Washington had not been fought. We were now at Charles- 
town, Virginia, but about ten miles from Winchester, rebels 
and patriots occupying about the same relative position as at 
Bunker Hill, although we had greatly the advantage. If the 
rebel Jo. Johnston expected an attack from Bunker Hill side, 
and had fortified accordingly, we had obviously gained much 
by appearing on the opposite side of Winchester, with a paved 
road and a railroad from Charlestown to that place. He 
could, in my judgment, be as well checked by your column 
at Charlestown as at Bunker Hill, and unless he had been 
attacked from the latter place immediately after our arrival , 
and defeated or severely cut up, we gained much by going 
to Charlestown in opening a way for future subsistence and 
receiving, if needed, by rail, other forces. If you could not 
defeat or cut up the rebel Johnston, it was wise to place 
yourself in better communication with your rear. In this 
you were governed, as I have said, by your reconnoissance. 
On Thursday, the 18th of July, the day after your arrival at 
Charlestown, I knew of your intention (having learned that 
McDowell had not engaged the rebels up to that time) to 
advance on Winchester, the rebel Jo. Johnston then being 
there with his forces. On the morning of that day I had 
been ordered to issue three days' rations to my command 
for this movement, but during the afternoon I received 
orders to move with my regiment to Harper's Ferry, to 
hold that place. I knew, by common report, that, in fur- 
therance of your plan to attack the rebel Johnston, you on 
Thursday and Friday, the 18th and 19th of July, made 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 113 

repeated efforts to induce your command (many regiments 
of which were then out of service) to remain with you for 
only a few days, while you advanced and held the rebels ih 
Winchester, or give them battle if they had met you. I 
heard that you plead, entreated, and expostulated with regi- 
ments whose term of service had expired, but with few ex- 
ceptions it availed nothing. I was informed that the number 
of your force with which you could, under these circum- 
stances, have attacked the rebels, did not exceed seven or 
eight thousand men; with these, in my judgment, to have 
moved elsewhere than Harper's Ferry would have been folly. 

" To sum it all up, it appears to me, writing from memory, 
after some six months have intervened, that if you had 
known that McDowell had not attacked the rebels, while 
you were at Bunker Hill, the question of whether you should 
have attacked Johnston depended upon your reconnoissance 
and means of information of his strength. The force of 
your reasoning, that you ought not to attack, is much more 
cogent, if your information- was positive that McDowell 
would attack on Monday or Tuesday, the 15th or 16th of 
July, or if you were only ordered to hold Johnston in 
check during those days, for then you were holding him 
in check. Your movement to Charlestown, whether Mc- 
Dowell had attacked or not, was wise for reasons, and also, 
that you were in better jposition to make the attack. You certainly 
lost nothing, as the rebel Johnston did not leave Winchester during 
your fiank movement. Your attempt to hold Johnston, when 
you learned at Charlestown, McDowell had not engaged the 
rebels, failed from causes not within your control. Men 
whose term of service had expired, would have fought no 
better at Bunker Hill than at Charlestown or Bull Run. I 
am very sure, attacks upon you would never have been made, 
for the course you pursued, had McDowell fought the battle 
of Manassas when you were informed and had the best of 
reasons for believing he was going to. 

" If these statements, hurriedly thrown together, meetyour 
conviction as arguments, I am happy to be able to furnish 
them. At the time, I heard none condemn you, but, my 



114 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

dear sir, when will man cease to be reviled by the ignorant 
and malicious ? 

" I am, very truly, 

" Your obedient servant, 

" George H. GtOrdon, 

"Colonel Second Massachusetts Reg't." 

From the gallant General Shields : 

"Washington, D. C, Feb. 20, 1862. 

" My dear General : 

" I long wished to write you, and write you as an old and 
true friend, who feels the full force of the injustice that has 
been attempted towards you, but I determined to wait until 
I could see what the Senate was disposed to do in my own 
case. Yesterday I was confirmed, after holding up my nomi- 
nation for weeks 

" But your case was one of crying injustice. It was for the 
attacking army to wait until you could co-operate with them. 
They had the power to time their attack to your movements, 
but you had not the power to accommodate your movements 
to the attack. But, General, military men do you justice, and 
the country is beginning to do it; and for one I have never 
failed everywhere to cry shame upon the base treatment you 
have received, and now I don't hear a man, who has a parti- 
cle of sense, who does not do the same 

" Your sincere friend, 

" James Shields. 

" General Robert Patterson, 

"Philadelphia." 



From Colonel Gibson, a Regular officer of great dis- 
tinction : 

" Headquarters Fort Delaware, Del., 
July 25, 1861. 

" General : 

" I am, my dear sir, acquainted with the nature of your 
^service, and the difficulties opposed to you, in your recent 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 115 

campaign. It is impossible for an officer of ordinary intel- 
ligence, to refer to the disasters of this week, without reflect- 
ing upon the untimely and crude plans of offensive opera^ 
tions in which no commander could take part but as a 
victim. I make allusion to these matters only to assure you 
of my respect, and that I shall consider it fortunate to be 
under your command, with the able staff" that served you, 
should you be called upon to take the tield again. 

" A. A. Gibson, 

" Captain Second Artillery, Commanding. 
"Major-General Egbert Patterson, 

" Philadelphia." 

The following resolutions of two regiments, the 
Twenty-fourth and Fifteenth Pennsylvania, who served 
under me, and were ready to remain if required, it gives 
me great pleasure also to refer to. 

" Proceedings of a Meeting of the Meld, Staff and Company 
Officers of the Twentg-fourth Regiment, Pennsylvania Volun- 
teers, commanded hy Colonel Joshua T. Owen, held at the 
Encampment near Charlestown, Virginia, on the 18th July, 
1861. 

" Whereas, We, the officers of the Twenty-fourth Regiment 
Pennsylvania Volunteers, believing that in the contest in 
which we are now engaged is involved the maintenance of 
constitutional freedom, and being devotedly attached to the 
Government of the United States, because of the great bless- 
ings it confers alike upon rich and poor, native and foreign 
born citizens, and 

" Whereas, A sense of duty as citizens induced us to take 
the field in defence of the Government, and 

" Whereas, Major-General Robert Patterson has this day 
appealed to us as patriots, to prolong the period of our ser- 
vice, in order that he may maintain his present strategical 
position, without detriment to the cause. Therefore, 

" Resolved, That having entire confidence in the capacity 
of our Commanding General as a soldier, and his integrity as 



116 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN 

a patriot, and admiring the skill with which he has advanced 
his column thus far without loss, or unnecessary delay, we 
will stand by him until our places are supplied by other 
troops." 

Second, those of the Fifteenth Regiment, whose gallant 
Colonel, Richard A. Oakford, was killed on the battle- 
field of Antietam : 

"Headquarters Fifteenth Regiment P. V., 

Harper's Ferry, July 24, 1861. 

" At a meeting of the officers and men of the Fifteenth Regi- 
ment, held this evening, they expressed unanimously their 
approval of General Patterson's official administration, at 
the same time deeply regretting that his military judgment 
should be questioned, knowing as they do the superior force 
of the enemy in position, and the unavoidable circumstances 
which controlled the movements of this column. It is also 
painful to their feelings to find the many important but 
bloodless victories achieved by his command overlooked in 
the hasty opinion of the public. 

" Richard A. Oakford, 

" Colonel Commanding." 

In the debate in Congress to which I have referred 
{ante, p. 79), the representative of the District where 
I live, the Hon. Charles J. Biddle, distinguished in the 
war with Mexico, and commanding at the beginning of 
this war, a body of State troops, addressed the House 
as follows : 

" Mr. Biddle. I ask the gentleman from Massachusetts to 
yield to me. 

"Mr. LovEJOY. I object. 

" Mr. Biddle. I ask the gentleman fi-om Illinois to with- 



IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 117 

draw his objection. It can do him no harm to hear a few- 
words from me on this subject. 

" Mk. Lovejoy. I withdraw my objection. 

" Mr. Gooch. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, 
but I take it for granted that if my time expires, that I shall 
be allowed two minutes after he has concluded. 

" Mr. Biddle. I thank the gentleman. 

" Mr. Speaker, General Patterson is my townsman and 
constituent, and I may assume to know as much of him as 
the gentleman from Tennessee. I have no personal know- 
ledge of the movements of the column which he commanded 
in July last. I was at that time in the military service, but 
in another part of Virginia, within the limits of General 
McClellan's command. But I have personal knowledge of 
the character of General Patterson. In his command were 
many of my constituents, connections, and friends, and I 
never heard one of them mention him in other terms than 
those of respect and confidence. He had upon his staff some 
of the most distinguished officers of the Regular Army, now 
deservedly filling positions of great trust; he had on his 
staff men of high character from civil life. They were fully 
cognizant of General Patterson's conduct and motives ; their 
characters are additional guarantees for his. 

" I believe that no man, really cognizant of the facts, has 
ever brought any charge against him, and that the vague, 
baseless rumors that have been circulated to his disadvantas-e 
are but hearsay upon hearsay, like the statement of the gen- 
tleman from Tennessee. Upon the occasion before Martins- 
burg, a brilliant affair at that time, when our greater and 
more glorious victories had not eclipsed it. General Patter- 
son's conduct was distinguished alike by military skill and 
personal intrepidity. All the contemporary accounts, verbal 
and published in the newspapers, from all sources, agreed in 
that. 

" With respect to his character at an earlier period, in the 
war with Mexico, I would not offer my humble testimony ; 
but I sent to the adjoining library and have had brought 
here the volume of reports, from which I can cite, under the 



118 NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN, ETC. 

clear and venerable name of Winfield Scott, tlie high testi- 
mony that was then borne to General Patterson's character 
as a soldier. At the siege of Vera Cruz, General Scott says 
that ' he can only enumerate the few who are isolated by 
rank or position, as well as by noble services.' He then 
mentions ' Major-General Patterson, second in command.' 
At Cerro Gordo, General Scott says : 

" ' Major-General Patterson left a sick-bed to share in the dangers and fa- 
tigues of the day, and after the surrender went forward to command the 
advanced forces towards Xalapa.' 

" lie also served during the war of 1812, as lieutenant and 
captain, in the Regular Army. Of course I had no contem- 
porary knowledge of his services there ; but I know that by 
those who had, he was esteemed as a soldier, even at that 
early period of his life. 

" This statement I have felt bound to make in behalf of a 
man who is my constituent, and who, I believe, has been 
unjustly aspersed by vague rumors and suspicions, only too 
common, and gaining too easy credence with us. Let me 
add, however, that in so doing I take no part in the criticisms 
upon General Scott, for whom no man living entertains 
higher respect than I do." [Congressional Globe, Feb. 17, 
1862.) 

The numberless private communications, both ver- 
bal and written, which I have received, approving my 
course, I shall refer to no further than to say, that 
they will ever merit, as they have always received, my 
warmest gratitude. 



INDEX. 



INDEX. 



Abercrombie, General, Brigade of, at Falling Waters, . 
at Council of War at Martinsburg, 
opinion of Johnston's retreat, 
report from Winchester, 1862, 
Annapolis, route through, established by Patterson, 
Army, Patterson's, strength of, June 25th-29th, 
" " July, 

Johnston's " June, 

July, . 
Artillery, Patterson's amount of field, June 29th, 
Johnston's " " . . 

Patterson's " siege, . 

Johnston's " left at Winchester, 

Averill, W. W. General, opinion of causes of defeat at Bull Run, 

Babcock, Lieutenant, U. S. A., at aflPair at Falling Waters, . 

repairs canal at Sandy Hook, 
Baltimore, passage forced through, ...... 

Banks, N. P. General, relieves General Patterson July 25th, 
Barnard, J. G. General, opinion of causes of defeat at Bull Kun, 
Barry, W. F. " " " " " " 

Beckwith, Captain, U. S. A., at council at Martinsburg, 

opinion of Johnston's retreat, . 
Berkley County, citizen of, statement of Johnston's force, 
Biddle, C. J. Colonel, commanding Brigade south of Bedford, 

speech in Congress in regard to General Patterson 
Biddle, Craig Major, at affair at Falling Waters, . 

minutes of council at Martinsburg, 
letter to Hon. F. P. Blair, . 
Blair, F. P. Hon., states that General Scott knew of Johnston'; 
coming, before Bull Eun, ... 
states the despatch of General Patterson received 
Bull Run, Battle of, popular feeling about, 

false theory as to loss of, . 
causes of defeat stated by General Richardson, 
" " " " Heintzelman, 

" " " ■ " Franklin, 

" " " " Wadsworth,. 

" " " " Slocum, 



PAGE 

47 

52-55 

57 

62, 63 

27 

43-47 

63 

43, 44 

57-62 

47 

61 

91 

62 

103, 104 

49 

76 

27 

85 

98, 99 

96, 97 

52-55 

57 

57, 58 

65 

116 

49 

54 

83 

79-83 
79-83 
9 
10 
93 
94 
95 
96 
96 



122 



INDEX. 



Bull Run, Battle of, causes of defeat stated by General Barry, 

" Keyes, 
" Barnard, 
" Griffin, 
Colonel Davies, 
General D. Tyler, 
" A. Porter, 
" Ricketts, 
" summary of, . 
Bunker Hill, Patterson advanced to, .... . 
reconnoissance sent out from, .... 



PAGE 

96, 97 

98 

98, 99 

99, 100 

101 

102 

103 

104 

105 

70 

70 



Cadwalader, Geo. General, opinion on recall of Patterson's troops, 35 
at council at Martinsburg, . . . 62-55 
report of, on Johnston's force, . . 59 
Cameron, Simon Hon., Secretary of War, approves conduct of Ge- 
neral Patterson, .......... 17 

Cavalry, Patterson's force, June 18th, . . . ... . 35 

" " " 28th, 45 

Johnston's " << " 45 

Chambersburg, camp formed at, ...... . 31 

Charlestown, Patterson proposes to move to, 67 

" ordered there by General Scott, . . 68 

" reports when he will go to, . . . 70 

" " what route he will take, . . 70 

" " preparation for advance from, . 76-112 

time of troops expire at, . . . . . . 77-84 

movement to, not a retreat, ..... 84-112 

Congress, debate in, regarding despatch of Patterson, . . . 78-83 
Covode, John Hon., false assertion regarding despatch, . . . 79-82 
Curtin, A. G. Governor, call upon, for troops, by Patterson, . 28 
promptness of response by, ... 29 
organizes Pennsylvania Reserves, . . 30 
Crosman, Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster-General, efforts to fur- 
nish transportation, ..... 50 

at council, Martinsburg, 52-54 

opinion of Johnston's retreat, .... 57 

Davies, T. A. Colonel, opinion of causes of defeat at Bull Run, . 101 

Falling Waters, engagement at, 47 

" General Patterson's official report of, 47 

Felton, S. M., patriotically furnishes steamboat, .... 27 

Franklin, General, opinion of causes of defeat at Bull Run, . . 95 

Gibson, Colonel, letter to General Patterson, 114 

Gooch, D. W. Hon., false assertion regarding despatch of Patterson, 79-81 



INDEX. 



123 



PAGE 

Grordon, General, review of Patterson's campaign, .... 109-114 

Griffin, Charles General, opinion of causes of defeat of Bull Kun, . 99, 100 

Halleck, Major-Gcneral, U. S. A., favorable criticism on Patter- 
son's campaign, .......... 39 

Harper's Ferry, preparation to capture, ...... 31 

instructions of General Scott regarding, . . 31,32 

evacuated by rebel forces, ..... 33 

Patterson's preparation to bold, .... 71 

Heights, Maryland, examination of, by General Newton, . . 41 

Heintzelman, General, opinion of causes of defeat of Bull Kun, . 94 

Hicks, Governor, assistance rendered by, 27 

Hudson, Lieutenant, commands battery at Falling Waters, . . 48 

Infantry, force of Patterson's June, 25th, ..... 43-47 

" Johnston's «< " 43-45 

" " July, 68-63 

'• Patterson's " 63 

Inquiry, Court of, asked for by General Patterson, ... 13 

refused him, ....... 15 

Intrenchments at Winchester, 57-63 

plan of, by Captain Simpson, U. S. 

Top. Engineers, ... 71 

Jackson, "Stonewall" General, attacks Patterson at Falling Waters, 47 

Johnston, Jos. E. General, not related to General Patterson, . . 21 

driven from Harper's Ferry, ... 33 

■ pursuit of, by Patterson, .... 33 

pursuit stopped by orders of General-in-chief, 33, 34 

force of, June 28th, ..... 43-45 

" July, 58-63 

plan to entrap Patterson, .... 56 

detained at Winchester by Patterson, . 70-77 

departure telegraphed to Washington, . 78 

arrival, effect of his, at Bull Eun, . . 93-105 

Keim, W. H. General, appointed by Governor of Pennsylvania, . 26 

in command at Chambersburg, ... 31 

at council at Martinsburg, .... 52-55 

letter to General Patterson, . . . 107 

Keyes, E. D. General, opinion on causes of defeat at Bull Kun, . 98 

Lackland, Mr., report of Johnston's force at Winchester, . . 60 

Leesburg, Patterson proposes to go to, . . . . . . 38 

advantage of position at, 38, 39 

opinion of General Halleck on position at, . . . 39 

McCall, G. A. General, letter of, regarding Pennsylvania border, 65 

McClellan, General, forbidden to send reinforcements to Patterson, 35 

mentioned, 117 



124 INDEX. 



PAGE 



McDonald, Mr., statement of Johnston's force at Winchester, . 69 

McDowell, General, success of, announced, ..... 72-77 

movements of, unknown to Patterson, . . 74 

Martinsburg, false position for Patterson, .... 40-55, 111 

entered by Patterson's forces, . . . . . 49 

Patterson too far advanced at, . . . . . 67 

Narrative, summary of Patterson's, ...... 85 

Negley, Major-General, at council at Martinsburg, . . . 52-55 

report on Johnston's force at Winchester, 58 

letter to General Patterson, . . . 109 
Newton, John Major-General, advises Patterson to ask for a Court 

of Inquiry, .... 12 

examines Maryland Heights, . . 41 

at affair at Falling Waters, . . 49 

at council at Martinsburg, . . 51-55 

at Harper's Perry, . . . . 74, 76 

opinion of Johnston's retreat, . . 67 

Oakford, Colonel, letter to General Patterson, .... 108 

Owens, Joshua T. Colonel, commands24th Pennsylvania Volunteers, 115 

Patterson, Kobert General, honorably discharged, .... 9 

application for Court of Inquiry, . . 12 

receipt of application of, acknowledged, 15 

Court of Inquiry refused, ... 15 
conduct of, approved by Secretary and 

Assistant Secretary of War, . . 17 

conduct of, approved by the President, 18 
application through Senate for letters 

and orders, ..... 19 

false accusations against, . . . 20, 21 
questions furnished Committee on War 

by, 22 

appointed Major-General of Pennsyl- 
vania troops, .... 26 

placed in command of Department, . 26 

opens Annapolis route to Washington, 27 
calls on Governor Curtin for 25,000 

more troops, ..... 28 

call of, revoked by War Department, . 29 
asks to enlist three regiments for the 

war, ...... 29 

refused by War Department, . . 30 

prepares to retake Harper's Ferry, . 31 

instructions to, of General Scott, . . 31, 82 

crosses Potomac in pursuit of Johnston, 33 

troops of, recalled by General Scott, . 34, 35 

censured by public for not pursuing, . 36, 37 



INDEX. 125 



Patterson, Robert General, asks to change his line and go to Lees- 
burg, ...... 37 

presents the advantages of that move, 38, 39, 66 

proposes to drive enemy to Winchester, 42 
force of June 25th, ... 43, 45, 47 

asks for reinforcements, ... 46 

crosses Potomac without them, . . 47 

column attacked at Falling Waters, . 47 

official report of engagement, . , 47 

enters Martinsburg, .... 49 

orders advance on Winchester, . . 51 

suspends order, ..... 62 

calls council of war on, ... 52 

statement to, .... . 53 

force at Martinsburg, .... 63 

less than General-in-chief intended, . 63 
probable result of a defeat, ... 64 
desires to protect the Shenandoah Val- 
ley, 64 

letter to Brigadier-General McCall, . 64 
inability on this line to hold Johnston, 66 
proposes to go to Charlestown, . . 67 
ordered to go there, .... 68 
asks when he shall approach Winches- 
ter, 68 

ordered to make demonstrations, Tues- 
day, July 16th, . . . . 68, 69 
success of, in retaining Johnston, . 70, 75 
informs General-in-chief the day he 

will go to Charlestown, . . 70 
warns of expiration of term of service 

of troops, 70, 84 

goes to Charlestown by Bunker Hill, . 70 

makes reconnoissance from Bunker Hill, 70 

prepares to hold Harper's Terry, . 71, 74 

asks, "Shall I attack?" . . . 73,74 

appeals to troops to remain, . . 74, 76, 113 

reports arrival at Charlestown, . . 75 

prepares to advance from, . . . 76, 112 

refusal of troops to remain, . . . 77,113 

keeps Johnston at Winchester, . . 77 

ignorant of McDowell's failure, . . 78 
informs of Johnston's departure from 

Winchester, 78, 83 

relieved by General Banks, ... 85 

summary of Narrative, ... 85 

remarks on testimony before Committee, 86 

review of General Scott's statement, . 89-93 



126 



INDEX. 



Patterson, Robert General, allusion in Scott's Autobiography to 

Patterson's service in Mexico, 
not " Chief" in Shenandoah Valley, 
review of testimony about Battle of Bull 
Run, .... 

gives causes of defeat at Bull Run, 
letter to, from Major-General Geo. H 

Thomas, U. S. A., 
letter to, from Major-Gen. W. H. Keim 
" " Col. Richard A. Oakford 

" " Major-Gen. J. S. Negley 

" " Brig.-Gen. G. H. Gordon 

" " " James Shields 

" " Colonel Gibson, U. S. A. 

resolutions regarding, of 24th Regiment 

Pennsylvania Volunteers, 
resolutions regarding, of 15th Regiment 

Pennsylvania Volunteers, 
service of, in War of 1812-15, 
remarks in Congress regarding, by Hon, 
C. J. Biddle, .... 

Patterson, Francis E. General, opens route through Baltimore, 
Pennsylvania, Governor of, organizes Reserves, 
Reserves, origin of, . 
volunteers, 11th regiment at Falling Waters, . 

" 15th and 24th regiments, resolutions of, 

" quota of, promptness in supplying, 

Perkins, Lieutenant, U. S. A., at aflair at Falling Waters, . 
President, the, approves conduct of General Patterson, . 

protests against fighting at Bull Run till his force 
arrives, ....... 

Price, R. Butler Major, at afi'air at Falling Waters, 

Porter, Andrew Brigadier-General, on causes of defeat at Bull Run 

Porter, Fitz John Major-General, advises Patterson to ask for a 

Court of Inquiry, 

at affair at Falling Waters, 

opinion of Johnston's retreat, . 

Rankin, A.N.,statementof artillery left by Johnston at Winchester, 
Richardson, J. B. General, opinion on causes of defeat at Bull Run 
Ricketts, General, opinion on causes of defeat at Bull Run, . 

Sanford, Major-Gen., expected with two guns and three regiments 

Scott, Lieut. -Gen., goes to Europe, 

instructions to General Patterson, 
recalls artillery and cavalry of Patterson, 
forbids pursuit of Johnston, 
transmits supposed plan of the rebels 



92 
92 

93-105 
105 

106 
107 
108 
109 
109 
114 
114 

115 

116 
118 

116 
27 
30 

30 

48 

115, 116 

25, 26 

48 

18 

79, 80 

49 

103 

12 
49 
57 

62 

93, 94 
104 

54 
16 
31, 32 
34, 35 
35 
56 



INDEX. 



127 



FAQE 

Soott, Lieut.-Gen., statement of artillery left at Winchester, . 61, 62 

orders Patterson to Charlestown, ... 68 

" " hold Johnston, July IGth, . 68 

informs Patterson of McDowell's success, . 72, 77 

asks Patterson if Johnston has stolen a march, . 73 

asked by Patterson, "Shall I attack?" . . 73,74 

informed of Johnston's departure by Patterson, 78, 82 

warned of expiration of term of service of troops, 70, 84 

review of Patterson's statement to Committee, 86, 88 

knew of Johnston's departure from Winchester, 88 

on General Patterson's character in Mexico, . 92, 118 

Scott, T. A. Hon., in favor of granting Court of Inquiry, . . 17 

Senate, U. S., resolution asking for correspondence and orders of 

General Patterson, 19 

resolution not complied with, . . . . . 19, 20 

Shenandoah, Valley of the, Patterson's efforts to protect, . . 64 
difficulty of advancing in, ... 91 
failure of other commanders to hold, . 92 
Sherman, John Hon., moves in Senate for orders and correspon- 
dence of Patterson, .... 19 

on staff of General Patterson, ... 29 

sent to Washington about Annapolis route, 27 
reports refusal of War Department to enlist 

more troops, ...... 29 

opinion on recall of troops from Patterson, 36 
informs General Patterson of injustice done 

him, 37 

Shields, James General, letter to General Patterson, . . . 114 

Simpson, Captain, U. S. Top. Eng., at council at Martinsburg, . 52, 55 

plan of works at Winchester, .... 71 

Slocum, H. W. General, opinion of defeat at Bull Kun, ... 96 

Stone, Colonel, joins General Patterson, 49 

at council at Martinsburg, ..... 52,55 

Thomas, Geo. H. Major-Gen., advises Patterson to demand Court 

of Inquiry, .... 11 
at affair of Falling Waters, . . 48 
at council of war at Martinsburg, . 52 
advises to go to Charlestown, . . 55 
opinion of Johnston's retreat, . . 57 
letter approving Patterson's cam- 
paign, 106 

Times, New York Daily, article of General Halleck on art of war in, 39 

Transportation, inadequacy of Patterson's, 49, 70 

Tripler, Surgeon, at affair at Falling Waters, .... 49 

Troop, Philadelphia City, at affair at Falling Waters, ... 48 

Troops, call on Governor of Pennsylvania for 25,000 additional, . 28 

" revoked by War Department, 29 



128 



INDEX. 



Troops, Patterson asks to enlist for the war, . 

enlistment of, refused, ..... 

recalled from Patterson when across the Potomac, 
opinion of General Cadwalader on recall of, 
" Hon. John Sherman on recall of, 

number of Federal, June 25, 
" rebel, " 

July, . 
" Federal, " 

expiration of term of service, 
appealed to by Patterson to remain, 
clothing of, . 
refusal of, to remain, . 
Tyler, Daniel General, opinion of causes of defeat at Bull Kiin, 

Valley of Shenandoah, efforts of Patterson to protect, . 
difficulty of advancing in, . 
failure of other commanders to hold, . 



PAGE 

29 

30 

34, 35 

35 

36 

43,47 

43, 44 

57, 62 

63 

46, 85 

74, 113 

76, 110 

77, 113 
102 

64 
91 
92 



Wadsworth, James General, opinion of causes of defeat at Bull Eun, 
War, Committee on Conduct of, action of, .... . 

unfairness of mode of proceeding, 
opinion of Congress upon it, 
false statement of members of, 
testimony before, . 

" as to Bull Eun, 

War, Council of, called by Patterson at Martinsburg, . 
minutes of, ..... . 

War, Secretary of, approves conduct of General Patterson, 
declines to furnish orders to Senate, . 
Assistant, in favor of granting court, 
Wellmore, Captain, statement of Johnston's force, 
Whiting, Major, plans defensive works at Winchester, . 
Winchester, Patterson proposes to drive enemy to, 

orders an advance on, ..... 

" suspended, ..... 

intrenchments at, ..... 

Johnston's forces detained there, 

his departure from, telegraphed by Patterson, 

Wisconsin, IstEegiment, Colonel Starkweather, at Falling Waters, 

3d " at Harper's Ferry, 



96 
21 
22 
25 
79 
86 
93 
52 

54, 55 
17 
19 
17 

57, 58 
61 
42 
51 
62 

57, 63 

70, 77 
78 
48 
76 



* 



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